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ABSTRACT 
 This research examined adolescent health risk behaviors from the perspective of 
dual-process theories. Specifically, assumptions underlying dual-processing theories were 
empirically examined in two experiments in which processing route was manipulated and 
subsequent measures of behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions to engage in 
casual sex and to drink alcohol were examined. The primary goals of Study 1 were two-fold. 
One goal was to demonstrate that processing route can be varied via an external factor, 
such as the instructional set used in the current study. The second goal was to examine the 
effect that the induced route of processing style had on health risk decisions. Overall, the 
results of Study 1 indicated that the between-subjects processing manipulation was 
successful in shifting participants’ reliance on either reasoned or experiential processing 
relative to a control condition. This result supports dual-process theory assumptions that 
riskier behavior is the result of less reasoned information processing. In addition, the results 
support predictions expected from the prototype willingness model that behavioral 
willingness reflects more experiential processing, and is more malleable than behavioral 
intentions (Gibbons, Gerrard, & Lane, 2003). The goals of Study 2 were to further examine 
whether external factors influence route of processing and to examine whether those effects 
were mediated by shifts in motives and outcome expectancies. These goals were addressed 
with an experiment in which participants received the same between-subjects manipulation 
of processing route as in Study 1 before assessing behavioral willingness, behavioral 
intentions, motives for engaging in sex, and outcome expectancies for drinking alcohol. The 
hypothesized effects of route of processing on behavioral willingness and not on behavioral 
intentions, as specified by the prototype willingness model, were supported. Partial support 
was found for the hypothesized mediated effects of processing condition through outcome 
expectances and motives on behavioral willingness to engage in casual sex and to drink 
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alcohol. Overall, results from the two experiments suggest that the between-subjects 
manipulation of processing route used in these studies was an effective way to induce 
reasoned and experiential processing, and that the effects of this manipulation on health risk 
cognitions were mediated by changes in motives or perceived outcome expectancies. 
Implications of these results for dual-process theories in general, the prototype willingness 
model specifically, and adolescent health risk behaviors are discussed.  
 
 
 
  
 
1
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW  
Traditional models of information processing are built upon the assumption that 
behavior is the result of a deliberate decision making process (Gibbons, Gerrard, Reimer, & 
Pomery, 2006). This process includes consideration of viable options, and potential 
consequences associated with each alternative. According to the theory of reasoned action 
(Ajzen, 1985), the end result of this process is the formation of behavioral intentions, which 
is the proximal predictor of all behavior. Research has supported the predictive validity of 
the construct of behavioral intentions, particularly for behaviors that have identifiable costs 
and benefits associated with them (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Uni-process information 
processing models, such as the theory of reasoned action, have been criticized, however, 
for failing to account for behaviors that are unintentional or irrational (Rise, 1994). 
In contrast, dual-process models of information processing propose that while people 
are capable of engaging in thoughtful and deliberate information processing, they often rely 
on a more efficient, heuristic based forms of information processing (Evans, 2007). 
Experiential processing reflects the fact that people often make decisions quickly, even 
automatically. This form of processing can account for errors and biases typically observed 
in studies of judgment and decision making that traditional approaches cannot (Evans, 
2003). Factors associated with experiential processing include individual differences, affect, 
and non-conscious influences. 
Because dual-process theories are able to account for behaviors that are irrational, 
or impulsive, they can better explain the health risk behaviors of adolescents. Most dual-
process models are not designed specifically to address health risk behaviors. The 
prototype-willingness model is a modified dual-process model that proposes that there is not 
one, but two distinct routes to health risk behaviors (Gibbons, Gerrard, & Lane, 2003). The 
behavioral intentions route represents the reasoned route, and is supported by the fact that 
people do at times intend, or specifically plan to engage in risk behaviors. In contrast, the 
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behavioral willingness route reflects an openness to risk opportunities and represents the 
route characterized by experiential information processing.     
The primary scientific objective of this dissertation was to advance current 
knowledge regarding dual-process theories of decision making, particularly as it pertains to 
health risk related decisions. This dissertation will make the following contributions to the 
literature. First, it will demonstrate that individuals’ route of processing can be influenced by 
external factors in the environment by establishing and validating a between-subjects 
manipulation of processing route, which has not yet been done. Second, it will examine how 
the effects of the manipulated route of processing are mediated by motives and outcome 
expectancies. Third, it will examine these issues in the context of health decisions, which is 
an important and theoretically relevant domain in which to do so.  
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CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION 
Behavioral decision making processing can occur in different ways. Sometimes 
people process information rationally1. This type of processing, referred to as reasoned 
processing, is characterized by analytical responding, effortful processing, and utilizing 
abstract symbols and concepts (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Reasoned processing is done 
slowly and deliberately and is generally associated with planfulness, delay of gratification, 
and reduced risk taking (for a complete review, see Reyna & Farley, 2006). Other times, 
people process information heuristically. This type of processing, referred to as experiential 
processing, is characterized by a reliance on judgmental shortcuts, or rules of thumb. 
Experiential processing2 is done quickly and efficiently and is associated with stereotypical 
thinking, prototypes, and holistic responding (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). The experiential 
system is often conceptualized as being passive and preconscious, which serves to put 
minimal strain on people’s available cognitive resources. As a result, the experiential system 
is thought to be a highly efficient processing system that functions quickly, sometimes even 
automatically. Theoretical models describing these different types of processes can be 
categorized into two distinct classes: Uni-process models and dual-process models. I next 
discuss these models and review research relevant to each.  
Uni-Process Models  
Uni-process models propose that people use reasoned thought processes to make 
decisions. Two of the most prominent uni-process models of decision making are the theory 
of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 
1985, 1991). These theories both posit that the proximal predictor of a behavior is one’s 
behavioral intentions to engage in that specific behavior. Behavioral intentions are based on 
one’s attitudes toward the specific behavior and perceived norms about the specific 
behavior, including consideration of the potential positive and negative consequences of 
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engaging in that behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The theory of planned behavior is an 
extension of the theory of reasoned action and includes the construct of perceived 
behavioral control to account for the fact that one’s behavioral intentions can only predict 
behavior to the extent that an individual feels that he or she has control over his or her 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). 
Both of these theories have received a great deal of support in the literature. For 
example, a recent meta-analysis of the theory of planned behavior revealed that behavioral 
intentions explain approximately 30% of the variance in people’s subsequent self-reported 
behavior, and 20% of the variance in their subsequent observed behavior (Armitage & 
Conner, 2001). These theories are most successful at predicting rational or socially 
appropriate behaviors such as seat-belt use and exercise behaviors. In sum, these findings 
provide evidence that uni-process models are well-suited to explaining how people make 
rational decisions about a variety of behaviors, particularly those that have identifiable costs 
and benefits associated with them (Gibbons, Gerrard, Reimer, & Pomery, 2006).  
 Nonetheless, uni-process models have also been criticized in two respects. First, 
they fail to take into account other influences on behavior, such as cooperation and the 
influence of other people (Rise, 1994). Second, uni-process models are based on the 
assumption that people consistently make decisions in a reasoned fashion. Considerable 
research has demonstrated, however, that people do not always make decisions in this way 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Decisions pertaining to behaviors that are socially 
undesirable, impulsive, or that have a significant affective component do not appear to arise 
from reasoned information processing (Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Ingham, Woodcock, & Stenner, 
1992; Eiser, Eiser, & Pauwels, 1993).  
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Dual-Processing Models 
The limitations associated with uni-process models prompted researchers to develop 
dual-process models of decision making. Unlike uni-process models that propose that 
people make decisions solely on the basis of effortful reasoned processing, dual-process 
models propose that people make decisions on the basis of a combination of reasoned and 
experiential processing (Evans, 2006; Chen & Chaiken, 1999). That is, dual-process models 
propose that people will sometimes engage in effortful, reasoned processing but other times 
will engage in resource efficient, heuristic processing. According to dual-process models, 
the experiential system enables people to process information efficiently and quickly, which 
is beneficial given people’s limited cognitive capacity to process information. 
The premise that decision making is sometimes governed by reasoned processing 
but other times governed by experiential processing has been demonstrated with a variety 
of tasks. One popular task used for this purpose is the ratio-bias task (Epstein & Pacini, 
1999). The ratio-bias effect refers to the fact that participants asked to make ratio-bias 
judgments reliably report higher subjective judgments of probability, when the probability is 
presented with ratios of larger numbers (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; p. 466). For example, if a 
person were given a choice between 1 in 10 odds or 10 in 100 odds of winning, logic 
suggests that there should be no consistent difference in which option the person would 
choose because the odds are equal. However, people consistently choose the option with 
10 in 100 chances over the option with 1 in 10 chances (Epstein & Pacini, 2001). Similar 
results are found even when 9 in 100 odds or even 7 in 100 odds are used as the alternative 
(Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998). Participants often report that 
even though they might “know better,” they “feel” like they have better chances with 10 in 
100 or 9 in 100 odds rather than 1 in 10. The ratio-bias effect illustrates a general 
phenomenon commonly found in the decision making literature; people often experience 
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conflict when trying to make decisions and will sometimes choose to make decisions on 
heuristics rather than logic (Evans, 2008; Stolarz-Fantino, Fantino, Zizzo, & Wen, 2003; 
Epstein, Donovan, Denes-Raj, 1999).  
Empirical studies testing dual-process models, such as those using the ratio bias 
task, are important because they have provided clear evidence that people do not rely solely 
on reasoned processing when making decisions, but instead sometimes rely on reasoned 
processing but other times rely on experiential processing.3 The tendency for people to 
make decisions on the basis of experiential processing has led researchers to hypothesize 
that the experiential system is a major determinant of overt behavior (Stolarz-Fantino, 
Fantino, Zizzo, & Wen, 2003; Epstein, Donovan, Denes-Raj, 1999; Reyna, 2004).  
 Although dual-process models have important strengths, the methods used to test 
their predictions have been limited in two respects. First, most of the relevant research 
testing dual-process models has been non-experimental (Reyna & Farley, 2006). 
Researchers often conclude post-hoc that participants were engaging in either reasoned 
processing or experiential processing based on outcome differences, such as age 
differences in performance on the ratio bias task, or response latency differences (Reyna & 
Farley, 2006; De Neys, 2006). The primary drawback of this kind of research is that although 
statistically significant differences can be revealed, those can be achieved without a full 
understanding of the mechanisms that produce them. Experimental research designed to 
systematically manipulate factors hypothesized to influence processing is necessary to gain 
a more accurate understanding of the nature of reasoned and experiential information 
processing, and the differential consequences associated with each type of processing. The 
literature’s reliance on non-experimental methods to test dual-process models also raises 
concerns about the generalizability of the conclusions. For example, developmental 
differences in performance on laboratory gambling tasks may not represent the same 
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developmental shifts in reasoning about real-world decisions (Reyna & Farley, 2006; 
Kershaw, Niccolai, Ethier, Lewis & Ickovics, 2003). More research is needed to examine the 
degree to which people are able to adopt either a reasoned or an experiential processing 
style on the basis of situational factors, and the subsequent effects that such processing 
styles have on their decisions. 
A second limitation to methods used to test dual-process theories is that, the little 
experimental research that has been done is often done using a within-subjects design (e.g., 
Epstein, Donovan, & Denes-Raj, 1999). The most commonly utilized dual-process research 
paradigm involves asking participants to report what decision they think “a rational person” 
would choose, what “most people” would choose, and what “they themselves” would 
choose. Participants consistently report that “rational people” would choose the rational 
option (e.g., the 1/10 vs. 9/100), but they themselves would choose the more appealing yet 
heuristic-based solution (e.g., 9/100 or 7/100; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Findings from 
these paradigms have led researchers to conclude that the ratio bias phenomenon is the 
result of experiential processing (Pacini & Epstein, 1999b). Although the findings that arise 
out of this design show that people are able to predict the choices that a “rational person” 
would make, they do not show that utilizing either a reasoned processing style or an 
experiential processing style leads to different subsequent outcomes. Experimental work 
that identifies the environmental and individual factors that are associated with reliance upon 
different styles of information processing, and their different outcomes is needed.  
Factors that influence route of processing  
 Research addressing the reasoned and experiential processing routes has shown 
that several factors influence which processing route people use during decision making, 
including individual abilities and preferences, affect, non-conscious effects, and their 
combination. These factors are discussed next. 
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 Individual differences. Research on decision making and heuristics has revealed that 
when positioning the reasoned and experiential processing modes in conflict with one 
another, there are some people who consistently make decisions based on reasoned 
processing (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), though most people tend to respond based on 
compromises between the two systems (i.e., admit that their decisions are being influenced 
to some degree by components of the experiential processing route). In order to examine 
individual differences in reasoned and experiential processing styles researchers have 
developed the rational-experiential inventory (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; 
Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The rational-experiential inventory is a self-report instrument that 
includes two sub-scales: the rationality subscale (e.g., “I am not a very analytical thinker”, “I 
enjoy intellectual challenges”) and the experiential subscale (e.g., “I like to rely on my 
intuitive impressions”, “I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings”) 
which are designed to assess individual differences in reasoned and experiential 
processing, respectively.  
Multiple studies, some performed by the scale’s creators and others performed by 
independent researchers, support the idea that reasoned and experiential processing styles 
reflect two distinct constructs, and that each independently predicts both personality 
attributes and overt behavior (e.g., Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Moreover, the correlation between the rationality and experientiality scales is not significant, 
and each is independently associated with Big Five personality characteristics, basic beliefs 
(e.g., favorable self), and emotional expressivity (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). For example, the 
rationality sub-scale is not significantly related to emotional expressivity, whereas the 
experientiality subscale is. The experientiality subscale is also significantly positively 
correlated with extraversion, whereas the rationality subscale is not. Moreover, others have 
found that endorsing superstitious beliefs is related to lower scores on the rationality 
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subscale of the rational experiential inventory (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Furthermore, it 
has been argued that the rational experiential inventory measures unique aspects of 
personality not captured by the Big Five scales (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Zang, 2002). 
Because individual differences on the rational experiential inventory have been shown to be 
reliable and predictive of personality characteristics, as well as reasoned and experiential 
processing, studies attempting to manipulate route of processing should include participants’ 
scores of rationality and experientiality from the rational experiential inventory as covariates. 
 Affective versus effortful processing. Emotion is proposed to be one factor 
associated with experiential processing (Epstein, 1994; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2002). The effects of emotion have received a great deal of research, 
particularly as it relates to judgment and decision making. Based on this research, there is 
evidence that being in an affective state relative to a more neutral state, is associated with 
changes in decision making and behavior (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). 
Affect can be described as an emotional state (ranging from negative to positive) that one 
experiences in response to some stimulus (Slovic et al, 2002). As Epstein (1994) describes, 
“If the activated feelings are pleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to 
reproduce the feelings. If the feelings are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts 
anticipated to avoid the feelings (p.716).” What is being hypothesized, therefore, is that 
judgment and decision making can be guided by affective feelings. Indeed, studies of health 
risk behavior have found that participants in negative moods reported greater behavioral 
intentions and behavioral willingness to engage in risky sexual behaviors (MacDonald and 
Martineau 2002; Pomery, 2004). Furthermore, others have found that participants in 
negative moods are more likely to utilize heuristics and are more likely to take risks (Mittal & 
Ross, 1998). However, other studies have shown that when a risk is hypothetical and the 
potential loss is small, participants who are in a positive mood are more willing to place risky 
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bets than participants who are in a neutral mood (Arkes et al., 1988; Isen & Geva, 1987; 
Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996). The authors suggest that positive mood promotes a 
shift from rule based decisions to utility based decisions, and this shift is responsible for 
greater risk taking behavior in positive mood participants. Although these two sets of 
findings appear to be contradictory, it has been proposed that people in positive moods are 
motivated to behave in ways that will maintain their current positive mood state, whereas 
those in negative mood states are motivated behave in ways that will improve their mood 
(Wegener & Petty, 1994; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995). This explanation is consistent 
with happy participants being more risky when the potential cost is low but being less risky 
when the potential cost is high, and negative mood participants being more risky when the 
potential gain is high. Thus, it appears that people selectively rely on heuristics consistent 
with their current mood state and motivation. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
there may not be a simple and clear relation between affect and decision making, but 
consistent with dual-process theories, it is clear that affect does influence decision making. 
 Preconscious influences on decision making. Dual-process theories unanimously 
propose that the experiential processing system is said to operate at a preconscious level 
(Evans, 2003, 2006; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1998; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
Stanovich, 1999). Preconscious thoughts and memories are those that are not currently 
undergoing deliberate cognitive elaboration, but which are available to the conscious mind 
for retrieval (Epstein, 1998). This aspect of the experiential system is important because it 
accounts for the finding that individuals’ decision making and overt behaviors can be 
influenced by factors in the environment that they are not currently devoting cognitive 
attention to, but that they could if they chose to (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). For example, 
when participants were primed with exemplars of hostility, they interpreted a target’s 
ambiguous behavior as more hostile than participants who were not primed with hostility 
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(Herr, 1986). Additionally, when participants are asked to think about a prototype (e.g., the 
elderly), those participants later reported attitudes that were more similar to the previously 
primed group’s attitudes (e.g., more conservative; Kawakami, Dovidio, and Dijksterhuis, 
2003). These results demonstrate that when individuals rely on images or prototypes to 
make decisions, rather than devoting deliberate cognitive effort, their subsequent decisions 
are influenced by those subtle environmental factors.  
Health Risk Behaviors 
 Adolescent health risk behavior is a serious concern in the United States, particularly 
with respect to sexual risk behavior and risky alcohol consumption (USDHHS, 2001). Recent 
data suggest that although teenage pregnancy and STD rates have decreased over the last 
10 years (CDC, 2002a), teen pregnancy rates are still four times higher in the United States 
than in other industrialized nations (CDC, 2002b), and a disproportionate number of teens 
are infected with STD’s every year compared to other demographic groups (USDHHS, 
2001). With various birth control and STD protection methods widely available to the public, 
how is it that teens arrive at the decision to put themselves at risk by engaging in risky 
sexual behaviors? In addition, approximately 90% of the alcohol consumed by youth under 
the age of 21 in the United States occurs in the form of binge drinking (4+ or 5+ drinks in a 
single setting for females and males respectively) and the proportion of binge drinkers is 
highest among the 18- to 20-year-old age group (OJJ, 2005). Although no single study can 
address these public health issues, the current research is aimed at gaining a better 
understanding of the decision making processes that are associated with adolescent health 
risk behaviors, particularly as it pertains to casual sex and to alcohol consumption.  
 Outcome expectancies and motives predicting health behavior. Extensive research 
has been devoted to understanding the factors that predict health risk behavior. For 
example personality characteristics (e.g., Sher & Trull, 1994), peers (Prinstein, Boergers, & 
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Spirito, 2001), parenting characteristics (e.g., monitoring; Borawski, Levers-Landis, 
Lovegreen, & Trapl, 2003), and community qualities (e.g., neighborhood violence; Brady, 
2006), have all been associated with adolescent health risk behaviors. Individuals’ 
anticipated consequences of a particular health risk behavior have also been extensively 
researched. Outcome expectancies represent one’s specific associations of engaging in the 
behavior and its anticipated effects (Annis & Davis, 1988; Goldman, Brown, & Christiansen, 
1987; Kushner, Sher, Wood, & Wood, 1994). Outcome expectancies have most often been 
examined with respect to alcohol consumption, though research on motives for engaging in 
sexual behaviors has also been conducted (e.g., Davis, Shaver, & Vernon, 2004; Fromme & 
D’Amico, 2000; Impett, Peplau, & Gable, 2005; Meston & Buss, 2007).   
Alcohol outcome expectancies are an important predictor of alcohol consumption, 
and have been shown to be a better predictor than demographic variables, or parental 
drinking, (Brown, 1985, Wall, Hinson, & McKee, 1998) and to differentiate high and low risk 
drinkers (Mann, Chassin, & Cher, 1987; Christiansen, Smith, Roehling, & Goldman, 1989). 
Although most of this research has been of a cross-sectional nature, outcome expectancies 
have been shown to predict alcohol consumption in longitudinal designs as well (e.g., 
Zamboanga, Horton, Leitkowski, & Wang, 2006).  
There is far less research on examining motives for sexual behaviors (Gillath, 
Mikulincer, Birnbaum, & Shaver, 2008) and most of the existing literature focuses on 
biological motives for engaging in sexual behaviors rather than psychological motives (e.g., 
Filippi et al., 2003) . It appears, however, that individuals engage in sexual behaviors as a 
means of initiating and maintaining romantic relationships (Birnbaum & Gillath, 2006). In 
addition, lower intimacy outcome expectancies have been associated with riskier 
(unprotected) sexual behaviors (Gebhardt, Kuyper, Gruensven, 2003). Overall, this body of 
research suggests that one’s motives for engaging in sexual behaviors and one’s outcome 
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expectancies for dinking alcohol are predictive of their current and future health risk 
behaviors. Therefore, research examining health risk cognitions would be improved by also 
including these constructs.  
Dual-processing models and adolescent health risk behavior  
 There is a wealth of evidence suggesting that as children age they become more 
adept at making thoughtful and well-reasoned decisions (e.g., Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, 
West, & Stanovich, 2002). For example, as children age they make fewer cognitive errors, 
leading researchers to believe that the reasoned system is becoming a stronger determinant 
of overt behavior. These empirical findings are supported by incidence data suggesting that 
as adolescents age, they gradually reduce the amount of risk taking (Reyna & Farley, 2006). 
One shortcoming of dual-process research, however, is that most dual-process models are 
not designed to address health risk behaviors in particular. Specifically, decision making 
processes that involve in making artificial “gambling” decisions in the laboratory may not be 
parallel to those involved in making personal health risk decisions. Furthermore, those 
models fail to account for the social nature inherent in much adolescent health risk decision 
making. 
Prototype-Willingness model. There are obvious circumstances in health in general, 
and specifically in adolescent risk behaviors, that demonstrate how the experiential system 
often “wins out” in the decision making process. Most teens are aware of the dangers of 
having unprotected sex (Gerrard & Luus, 1995) or having sex with someone with whom they 
are unfamiliar. Despite this rational knowledge, however, teens are still getting STDs and 
unwanted pregnancies. The prototype-willingness model of adolescent health risk behavior 
is a modified dual-processing model that is designed specifically to explain and predict 
adolescent health risk behavior. The model maintains that behaviors are not always 
intentional, but are oftentimes the result of reactions to risk-conducive situations (Gibbons & 
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Gerrard, 1995, 1997). Like other dual-processing models, the prototype-willingness model 
proposes that there are two pathways to adolescent risk behavior that involve different types 
of information processing. The first is the reasoned or intentional pathway that reflects the 
fact that sometimes adolescents intend to engage in risk behaviors, such as binge drinking 
and unprotected sex. This route (referred to as the reasoned route) involves some degree of 
pre-contemplation, not only of the behavior, but also of the potential outcomes, and reflects 
a more deliberate processing system. Because of this reasoned approach, behavioral 
intentions is more stable and less influenced by outside factors (e.g., social comparison; 
Gibbons, Gerrard, & Lane, 2003; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1995). This reasoned route is based 
upon behavioral intentions as described in the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen, 1985) and 
the theory of planned behavior, and is similar to the reasoned route of processing described 
in other dual-process theories (e.g., the cognitive experiential self theory; Epstein & 
Pacinin,1999). 
The second pathway described in the prototype-willingness model is the social 
reaction path, which is akin to the experiential path described by other dual-process models. 
This route reflects the fact that although adolescents may not plan to or intend to engage in 
a risky behavior, they often do so in response to social circumstances. This idea is captured 
in the construct of behavioral willingness, which reflects an openness to risk opportunity that 
involves less pre-contemplation of the behavior and its consequences (Gibbons, Gerrard, 
Ouellette, & Burzette, 1998). Because behavioral willingness is more influenced by outside 
factors (e.g. context, affect, social comparison) than behavioral intentions, it has been 
shown to be important for predicting adolescents’ risk taking behavior, and more predictive 
than behavioral intentions up to a certain age (Gibbons et al., 2004; Gibbons et al., 2003; 
Gibbons & Gerrard, 1995, Gibbons, Gerrard, Blanton, & Russell, 1998; Gibbons, Gerrard, 
Reimer, & Pomery, 2006). As adolescents age and gain additional experience with risk 
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behaviors, behavioral willingness becomes less predictive of their future risk behavior, 
relative to behavioral intentions. Furthermore, research using the prototype-willingness 
model has demonstrated that both behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions are 
significant, yet independent, predictors of health risk behavior (Gibbons et al., 2006).  
Because research has shown that adolescents utilize both the reasoned and 
experiential processing routes when making decisions about health, research paradigms 
based upon dual-process theories of decision making should include both the behavioral 
willingness and behavioral intentions constructs in order to more fully understand factors 
that influence processing via the two different routes. The prototype-willingness model has 
been successful in predicting and accounting for adolescent health risk behaviors, 
particularly with respect to longitudinal and prospective correlational data. However, there is 
relatively little laboratory research examining the constructs of this model. The current 
research will expand the existing literature by using an experimental design in the laboratory 
to test the assumptions of dual-process models in general, with the constructs specified by 
the prototype-willingness model. 
Dual-processing theories and outcome expectancies.  
 There has been little published research examining the specific relations between 
dual-process theories and motives or outcome expectancies for health risk behaviors. Three 
factors, however, have been shown to affect both peoples’ route of processing and their 
motives or outcome expectancies; these include personality characteristics, affect, and 
preconscious influences, these relations are described next.    
 Individual differences. Many research studies have explored the relations between 
personality traits and health risk behaviors (see Hoyle, Fejfar, & Millar, 2000 for a meta-
analytic review). There have been fewer studies examining personality characteristics and 
motives for having sex or outcome expectancies, although it appears that extraversion is 
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associated with significantly higher positive outcome expectancies for alcohol, whereas 
neuroticism is associated with significantly higher negative outcome expectancies for 
alcohol (Read & O’Connor, 2005). In addition, it has been shown that the relation between 
extraversion and sexual risk taking behavior is mediated through motives for sex (Ingledew 
& Ferguson, 2007). Therefore, personality characteristics, such as extraversion that have 
been shown to predict more experiential processing (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), have also 
been shown to predict individuals’ outcome expectancies for drinking alcohol and 
individuals’ sex motives related to both risky sexual and drinking behaviors, respectively. 
Therefore, it is possible that the factors that predict individuals’ route of information 
processing also predict their outcome expectancies for alcohol and motives for having sex. 
Thus, outcome expectancies and motives may be an important mediator between 
personality characteristics, such as processing style, and health risk behaviors.  
 Affect. Researchers have recently begun to explore the associations between affect 
and outcome expectancies for alcohol use, and to a lesser degree the relation between 
affect and motives for sexual behaviors. This research has demonstrated that negative 
affect is predictive of greater endorsement of positive alcohol expectancies in both 
correlational and experimental research designs (Hufford, 2001, Demmel, Nicolai, 
Gregorzik, 2006). In addition, positive mood states were correlated with more negative 
outcome expectancies (e.g., more negative evaluation of alcohol-induced sedation effects). 
Although there are only a few studies that examine the relation between affect and outcome 
expectancies for alcohol use, there is evidence to suggest that one’s perceived outcomes of 
drinking alcohol are related to one’s current mood state. The relation between affect and sex 
motives has been most elaborately detailed in a large panel study of over 1,600 young 
adults (Cooper, Agocha, & Sheldon, 2000). The results suggest that mood enhancement 
motives associated with sex, are significantly associated with both risky sexual behaviors 
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(i.e., lack of condom use, many partners) and with risky alcohol consumption (i.e., frequent 
heavy drinking, problems associated with heavy drinking). In sum, although there has been 
far more research on the association between affect and risk behavior, there appears to be 
evidence that affect influences outcome expectancies for alcohol and sex motives as well. 
Because affect appears to influence both route of processing and outcome expectancies 
and motives, it is possible that outcome expectancies and motives may mediate the effects 
of route of processing on risk cognitions. 
 Preconscious effects. Several studies have documented that preconscious factors 
influence alcohol consumption in the laboratory (Roehrich & Goldman, 1995; Stein, 
Goldman & Del Boca, 1997). Three such studies, each using a modified Stroop task to 
present words related to alcohol outcome expectancies document this association 
(Roehrich, & Goldman, 1995). Individuals exposed to positive outcome expectancy related 
words consumed significantly more alcohol than did individuals presented with neutral 
words. Other researchers have also documented that individuals primed with positive 
outcome expectancies subsequently drink more alcohol than participants in a control group 
who are not primed with outcome expectancies; similarly participants primed with negative 
outcome expectancy words subsequently drink less alcohol than participants in a control 
group who are not primed with outcome expectancies (Carter et al., 1998) These findings 
provide evidence that activating concepts related to outcome expectancies, even when 
people are not devoting full cognitive attention to those concepts, can influence alcohol 
consumption (Jones, Corbin, & Fromme, 2001). Much less research has been conducted 
examining preconscious influences on sexual behaviors. Five studies were conducted in 
which participants were primed (for 30 milliseconds) with sexual images (Gillath, Mikulincer, 
Birnbaum, & Shaver, 2008). Results of these studies indicated that participants receiving 
those primes showed increases in relationship enhancing motives (e.g., preference for using 
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positive conflict resolution strategies). Thus, there is substantial evidence that preconscious 
factors influence outcome expectancies for alcohol use. There is less, although consistent, 
evidence for a similar relationship for sex motives. The fact that individual differences in 
personality, current mood state, and preconscious factors, predict both experiential 
processing and alcohol outcome expectancies and sex motives suggests that these factors 
may be important mediating variables between processing style and behavioral willingness 
to engage in health risk behaviors. Addressing this possibility was a primary goal of the 
current research.  
   
  
 
19
CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1 OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Conceptual Overview 
The current study had two primary goals. Researchers have often claimed that risky 
behavior is the result of experiential processing rather than reasoned processing. As 
mentioned previously, these conclusions are drawn in a post-hoc fashion. Therefore, the 
goals of Study 1 were to 1) induce either experiential or reasoned processing and 2) then 
examine the effect that these processing styles had on both analytical reasoning task 
performance and adolescent health risk decisions. Because processing styles were 
experimentally manipulated, any resulting differences in analytical reasoning task 
performance and health risk decisions, particularly participants’ behavioral willingness to 
engage in casual sexual behaviors and drink alcohol, could be attributed to differences in 
induced processing style; such differences, if found, would represent the first known 
successful between-subjects manipulation of route of processing in the laboratory to 
examine health risk decision making.  
Study 1 used a 3 (Processing route: reasoned, control, vs. experiential) X 2 
(Questionnaire order: behavioral willingness first vs. behavioral intentions first) mixed model 
experimental design. The processing route condition was between-subjects, while 
questionnaire order was a within-subjects manipulation. This design allowed for examination 
of the effect of an induced route of processing on participants’ health risk decisions. 
Participants were asked to answer a variety of questions, and instructed to do so in one of 
three ways. The processing manipulation was delivered by asking participants in the 
reasoned processing condition to answer using strictly logical responding (note that 
“reasoned” refers to participants in the reasoned processing condition, while “rational” or 
“rationality” is used to refer to self-reported trait measures of reliance on rational processing) 
. Participants in the experiential processing condition were asked to respond using gut level, 
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intuitive responding while participants in the control condition were asked to respond to the 
questionnaire items as they normally would. The participants in the current study who were 
in the reasoned processing condition were given similar instructions as a way to strengthen 
the manipulation (Appendix A). Because previous work has demonstrated that responses to 
health risk items are often influenced by the order of the questions (e.g., Reimer, 2006), 
participants received one of two questionnaire orders, either behavioral willingness to 
engage in casual sex, or behavioral intentions to engage in casual sex was asked first. This 
manipulation is important because it is hypothesized that the act of answering the behavioral 
intentions items first may induce more reasoned processing. Consistent with this reasoning, 
behavioral willingness tends to be significantly lower when participants respond to 
behavioral intentions beforehand.  
Study 1 Hypotheses 
 Study 1 was designed to test three hypotheses related to the route of processing. I 
next discuss these hypotheses in detail. 
 Route of processing. According to the validation hypothesis, it was predicted that 
processing condition would influence participants’ self-reported rationality, odd-ratio task 
performance, and response times. Results would support this hypothesis, and offer 
validation of the processing manipulation if a) a main effect route of processing condition 
emerged, and b) if the pattern of means were consistent with the patterns described below. 
First, participants were asked to report the degree to which they used rational or experiential 
processing during the experimental session. It was expected that participants in the 
reasoned condition would report significantly higher levels of rationality than participants in 
the control condition, who were expected to report significantly higher levels of rationality 
than the experiential condition. Second, as a reflection of greater reliance on heuristics, it 
was expected that participants in the experiential processing condition would report 
significantly higher levels of confidence for the 10/100 and 9/100 ratio bias options than the 
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1/10 option. In contrast, it was hypothesized that participants in the reasoned processing 
condition would report significantly lower confidence with 9/100 odds than the 1/10 and 
10/100 options. Finally, a main effect of processing route is expected to influence response 
times to questionnaire items. Those in the experiential condition are expected to respond 
quicker to all questionnaire items than participants in the other conditions, and those in the 
reasoned condition are expected to respond slower relative to the other two conditions. 
These findings would support the contention that experiential processing is characterized by 
less processing time, and reasoned processing is marked by greater processing time. In 
sum, results supporting these predictions would suggest that the manipulation used in this 
study was a valid procedure for inducing reasoned or experiential processing.  
 The hypothesis that people’s use of a particular route of processing influences their 
behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors was examined next. Specifically, it 
was predicted that people using experiential processing would be more willing than those 
using reasoned processing to engage in a variety of health risk behaviors. Results would 
support this hypothesis if, a) there was a main effect of processing condition on participants’ 
reported behavioral willingness to engage in risky sexual behaviors or alcohol use, and b) 
the patterns of means indicated the greatest behavioral willingness among participants in 
the experiential condition, and the lowest behavioral willingness among participants in the 
reasoned condition. Because behavioral intentions are more stable than behavioral 
willingness, behavioral intentions were not expected to shift as a result the processing 
manipulation; therefore, a main effect of processing route manipulation was not expected on 
behavioral intentions items 
 It was also hypothesized that participants’ behavioral willingness would be influenced 
by the order in which behavioral willingness was assessed relative to behavioral intentions. 
Specifically, it was predicted that the significant main effect of the processing manipulation 
on behavioral willingness would be moderated by questionnaire order. Results would 
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support this hypothesis if, a) a significant interaction between processing condition and 
questionnaire order emerged, and b) if the pattern of means revealed that participants in the 
experiential condition who answered behavioral willingness first reported the highest 
behavioral willingness, and if those who were in the reasoned condition and answered 
behavioral intentions first reported the lowest behavioral willingness.
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 1 RESEARCH METHODS 
Experimental Design 
 Participants were randomly assigned to a 3 (route of processing: reasoned, vs. 
experiential vs. control) X 2 (Question order: behavioral willingness first vs. behavioral 
intentions first) mixed-model experimental design. Route of processing was the between-
subjects factor whereas question order was the within-subjects factor. Participants assigned 
to the reasoned processing condition were asked to respond to the items using logical 
reasoning. Participants assigned to the experiential processing condition were asked to 
respond to the questionnaire items using intuition and their gut level reactions. Finally, 
participants in the control condition were asked to respond to the questionnaire items as 
they themselves normally would (Appendix A). 
Participants  
 The sample included 139 undergraduate students at Iowa State University who were  
enrolled in an introductory level psychology course and who also participated in the 
psychology department’s mass testing sessions (see Table 1 for participant distribution by 
experimental condition).. Each participant earned research credits in partial fulfillment of a 
research requirement for their course. The sample was 58% female and 87% Caucasian. 
The average age of participants was 20.1 years. The participants in this study were 
representative of the geographical area and university community from which they were 
drawn.  
Table 1 
Study 1 Cell Counts by Experimental Condition 
 
Reasoned Control Experiential 
BW first 
questionnaire 
29 25 23 
BI first questionnaire 27 26 19 
Note. Reasoned refers to reasoned processing condition. Control refers to control 
processing condition. Experiential refers to experiential processing condition. BW refers to 
behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions.  
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Measures 
 A questionnaire assessed participants’ past behavior, individual differences in 
processing style, and participants’ behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions to 
engage in risky sexual and alcohol consumption behaviors. Each of these measures is 
described next. 
 Past behavior. Participants completed a series of items that asked about their 
previous sexual experiences and previous alcohol consumption (Appendix C). Participants 
responded to these items on 10-point Likert type scales with anchors 1 (zero casual sexual 
partners) and 10 (10 or more casual sexual partners) for previous sexual behaviors, and 1 
(never) and 10 (12 or more times this month) for previous drinking behaviors.  
Individual differences in processing style. The Rational-Experiential Inventory 
(Appendix B; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) was used to measure individual differences in 
participants’ tendency to rely on either reasoned or experiential processing when making 
decisions in everyday life. The full version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory includes 40 
items that make up the rationality and experientiality subscales, each of which include an 
ability and engagement subscale; totaling four 10-item subscales. The rationality scale 
includes items such as “I enjoy intellectual activities”, and “I am not a very analytical thinker”. 
The experientiality scale includes items such as “I like to rely on my intuitive impressions” or 
“I believe in trusting my hunches”. Participants responses to these subscales were assessed 
on 5-point Likert type scales with anchors 1 (definitely not true of myself) and 5 (definitely 
true of myself).  Items were reverse scored per coding instructions, such that higher scores 
on the experientiality scale reflect a stronger self-reported affinity toward intuitive or gut-level 
responding. Similarly, higher scores on the rationality scale reflect a stronger self-reported 
tendency toward reasoning and logic-based decision making. Five items from each of the 
four subscales that have been shown in previous research (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) to have 
the strongest factor loadings were used. Space limitations during measurement required 
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that participants responded to a subset of 20 of the original 40 items from the Rational 
Experiential Inventory. These items showed high internal reliability for both the rationality 
subscale (α= .81) and experientiality subscale (α= .79) with the current sample. These 
reliability scores are comparable4 (although slightly lower) to the reliability scores observed 
by researchers using the full Rational Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Ratio-bias. As an indicator of the degree to which participants processed rationally or 
experientially during the experimental session, they were asked to respond to a ratio-bias 
task similar to what has been used in other research (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The problem 
asks participants to decide which of two different lotteries they would rather participate in: 
Lottery A, where there is one red jelly bean out of 10 total jelly beans, versus Lottery B, 
where there are 10 red jelly beans out of 100 total jelly beans, versus Lottery C, where there 
are 9 red jelly beans out of 100 total jelly beans. Participants reported how confident they 
would feel about their chances of drawing a red jelly bean from each lottery on a 7-point 
scale with anchors 1 (not at all confident) and 7 (extremely confident). Significantly lower 
reported confidence in Lottery A, than in Lottery B or C is suggestive of more experiential 
processing (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
 Behavioral intentions. Participants completed a series of items designed to assess 
their intentions to engage in risky health behaviors (Appendix C). Some of these questions 
focused on risky sexual behaviors (e.g., sex with a casual partner) whereas others focused 
on risky alcohol consumption (e.g., going out with the intention of getting drunk). Participants 
responded to these items on 7-point Likert type scales with anchors 1 (definitely will not) and 
7 (definitely will). The items assessing behavioral intentions and behavioral expectations to 
have casual sex showed high internal reliability at both Time 1 (α = .94) and Time 2 (α = 
.91). Behavioral intentions and behavioral expectation to drink alcohol were reliable at both 
Time 1 (α = .99) and Time 2 (α =.98). Participants completed the behavioral intentions items 
twice, once during mass testing and then again during the experimental session. All 
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behavioral intentions items were standardized and combined into an overall index of 
behavioral intentions to engage in health risk behaviors. 
 Behavioral willingness. Participants were asked to read a series of hypothetical 
situations in which they encounter the opportunity to engage in health risk behaviors (e.g., 
the participant meets an attractive person at a party who wants to go home with him / her; 
the participant is at a party and is feeling they have had enough alcohol to drink; Appendix 
C) and asked to rate how willing they would be to do each of several different behaviors 
(e.g., “have oral sex” with the target, “stay at the party and continue to drink”) on a 7-point 
Likert type scale with anchors 1 (not at all willing) and 7 (very willing). Responses to these 
items were aggregated into an index by taking the sum of each individual item for that 
particular risk behavior (i.e., casual sex or alcohol use). Participants completed the 
behavioral willingness items twice, once during mass testing and then again during the 
experimental session. Internal reliabilities for behavioral willingness to have casual sex at 
Time 1 (α = .90) and Time 2 (α =.89) were quite high. Similarly, behavioral willingness to 
drink measures at Time 1 and Time 2 showed excellent internal reliabilities (αs =.88 & .86 
respectively). All behavioral willingness items were standardized and combined into an 
overall index of behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors. 
Response time. Response time, in milliseconds, was collected for all questionnaire 
items. Response times were aggregated into separate indices reflecting separate average 
response time for behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions to engage in health risk 
behaviors. Because response times were negatively skewed, raw scores were inverse 
transformed. This procedure is recommended when response times are negatively skewed, 
but the overall range of response times is relatively small (Weisberg, 1985). Accordingly, 
there were outliers are present in the data, but there were few of them, and they were not 
extreme, therefore, an inverse transformation was the most appropriate transformation.  
Procedure 
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 Data collection occurred at two time points. Time 1 occurred during mass testing, a 
large-scale survey session organized by the department of psychology, in which all 
undergraduate students enrolled in introductory level psychology courses have the 
opportunity to gain research credit. Students who participated in mass testing responded to 
the past behavior questions, the Rational Experiential Inventory, and the behavioral 
willingness and behavioral intentions questions. Only undergraduates who participated in 
mass testing were eligible to participate in the subsequent experimental session during 
which time they individually participated in a single laboratory session. At this session, they 
were told that they were participating in an experiment designed to examine decision 
making processes. The experimenter informed participants that for this task they would be 
asked to make a series of decisions regarding situations typically faced by college students. 
After participants read and signed an informed consent form, they were each led to a private 
room and seated at a computer screen and keyboard, and the task was begun. MediaLab 
software was used to present the questionnaire items and record the responses for all 
dependent measures. Route of processing was manipulated at this point in the sessions. 
Specifically, participants were informed that they would be asked to respond to a series of 
questions regarding situations frequently faced by college students. Although all participants 
were given instructions on how to respond to these questions, the instructions they received 
were varied in order to manipulate route of processing. Participants in the reasoned 
condition were instructed to respond to the items using logical reasoning. Participants in the 
experiential condition were instructed to respond by using intuition and gut level reactions. 
Participants in the control condition were instructed to respond how they would normally 
(Appendix A). Additionally, after the experimenter gave the instructions to the participants in 
the reasoned and experiential conditions, the experimenter placed a sign on the desk 
reading, “Think logically” or “Go with your gut”, respectively to serve as a continuous 
reminder of the processing instructions. Immediately after the processing manipulation was 
  
 
28
delivered, participants began the questionnaire (Appendix C). All participants responded to 
all of the same questionnaire items; however participants were randomly assigned to 
respond to these questions in a particular order. Because the order of assessment of 
behavioral intentions and behavioral willingness has been shown to influence responses to 
behavioral willingness (Reimer, 2006), questionnaire order was counterbalanced in the 
current study. Participants assigned to the behavioral willingness first condition answered 
the behavioral willingness items first followed by the behavioral intentions items. Participants 
assigned to the behavioral intentions first condition answered the behavioral intentions items 
first followed by the behavioral willingness items. In both conditions, questions pertaining to 
risky sexual behavior always preceded questions pertaining to risky alcohol use behaviors. 
After completing the questionnaire, participants were fully debriefed, and the experimental 
session was concluded.  
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY 1 RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
Descriptive statistics. The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all Time 1 
and Time 2 variables are presented in Table 2. Tables D1, D2, and D3, in Appendix D 
present the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all Time 1 and Time 2 variables 
for the reasoned, experiential, and control conditions separately. Participants at Time 1 
reported low to moderate behavioral willingness to have casual sex (M = 5.5) and very low 
intentions to have casual sex in the future (M = 4.0). Specifically, 66% of the sample 
reported ever having been sexually active. These participants reported between 1 and 12 or 
more lifetime sexual partners (M = 3), and less than 2 casual sexual partners, on average. 
Participants also reported relatively low behavioral willingness to drink alcohol (M = 6.7) and 
moderate behavioral intentions to drink in the future (M = 13.9). Specifically, 64% of the 
sample reported some alcohol use in the past month. Within this time frame, these 
participants reported between 1 and 12 or more servings of alcohol (M = 4), and between 1 
and 12 or more episodes of binge drinking. Although there was a large range of previous 
sexual partners and drinking behavior, the majority of participants reported minimal risk 
taking behavior. Furthermore, the participants in this sample reported lower behavioral 
willingness and behavioral intentions than participants in other studies using similar 
questions in similar samples (e.g., Houlihan, 2008). In sum, the participants in this study 
appear to be relatively representative of the young college population they were recruited 
from in terms of having relatively little past health risk behavior, and low behavioral 
intentions and behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behavior in the future.  
Testing for random assignment to condition. Prior to hypothesis testing, preliminary 
analyses were performed to examine whether random assignment to the processing and 
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question order conditions had been achieved. These analyses tested whether processing 
condition and questionnaire order had significant effects on any of the Time 1 measures. 
Table 2 
Study 1 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Rational -- 
92 
.051 
90 
-.13 
87 
-.09 
92 
-.02 
71 
-.10 
92 
-.24* 
72 
-.00 
92 
-.12 
72 
-.12 
92 
2. Experiential 
 
-- 
92 
-.00 
87 
.12 
92 
-.19 
71 
-.05 
92 
-.20† 
73 
.03 
92 
-.08 
72 
.08 
92 
3. Casual sex BW (Time 1) -- 
88 
.77*** 
88 
.36** 
71 
.37*** 
88 
.72*** 
73 
.52*** 
88 
.43*** 
72 
.41*** 
88 
4. Casual sex BW (Time 2) 
 
-- 
139 
..34** 
71 
.39*** 
139 
.55*** 
73 
.67*** 
139 
.45*** 
72 
.47*** 
139 
5. Drinking BW (Time 1) 
  
-- 
71 
.70*** 
71 
.36** 
71 
.31** 
71 
.75*** 
70 
.66*** 
71 
6. Drinking BW (Time 2) 
  
-- 
139 
.42** 
73 
.30*** 
139 
.63*** 
72 
.60*** 
139 
7. Casual sex BI (Time 1) 
    
-- 
73 
.65*** 
73 
.47*** 
73 
.35** 
73 
8. Casual sex BI (Time 2) 
     
-- 
139 
.41*** 
72 
.41*** 
139 
9. Drinking BI (Time 1) 
       
-- 
73 
.85*** 
72 
10. Drinking BI (Time 2) 
       
-- 
139 
Mean 
(SD) 
33.7 
(6.48) 
33.9 
(5.91) 
5.52 
(4.15) 
6.36 
(3.77) 
6.65 
(3.62) 
8.76 
(3.34) 
4.03 
(3.18) 
4.42 
(3.49) 
13.91 
(9.72) 
17.53 
(9.66) 
Note. Sample sizes are reported on diagonal. Rational refers to the rationality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from Rational 
Experiential Inventory. BW refers to behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions. 
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
The potential effects of these variables were assessed separately in a series of one-way 
ANOVAs in which the following Time 1 measures served as the dependent variables: 
rationality, experientiality, behavioral willingness to have casual sex, behavioral willingness 
to drink alcohol, behavioral intentions to have casual sex, and behavioral intentions to drink 
alcohol. Results that examined the effect of processing condition yielded a single significant 
finding: There was a main effect of processing condition on the Time 1 measure of 
behavioral willingness to drink alcohol, F (2, 68) = 3.72, p < .05, such that participants in the 
reasoned condition showed greater Time 1 behavioral willingness (M = 7.96) than did 
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participants in the experiential (M = 6.23) or control (M = 5.18) conditions. No other 
significant effects emerged, Fs < 2.24, ps > .05. Results that examined the effect of question 
order yielded no significant effects on any of the Time 1 measures, Fs < 1.9, ps > .17. In 
general, therefore, it appears that random assignment was achieved, except for the higher 
behavioral willingness to drink alcohol present among participants in the reasoned condition 
at Time 1. Ideally, there would be no significant effects of condition on any Time 1 
measures; however, this significant difference is in the opposite direction of the 
hypothesized relations, thereby suggesting that analyses involving this variable will most 
likely produce conservative estimates  
Manipulation check: Processing condition. To test the effectiveness of the route of 
processing manipulation, three sets of analyses were performed, with follow-up contrasts 
that used the LSD (Least Significant Difference) method. First, the influence of route of 
processing on participants’ self-reported rationality was examined with a 3 (processing 
condition) X 2 (question order) between subjects ANCOVA in which Time 1 measures of 
participants’ trait rationality and trait experientiality served as covariates. Results revealed a 
significant main effect of processing condition on self-reported rationality, F (2, 82) = 17.55, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .25. Follow-up contrasts revealed that participants in the reasoned condition 
reported greater rationality than participants in the experiential and control conditions, ps 
<.001 (Table 3). Participants in the experiential and control conditions, however, did not 
significantly differ from one another, p > .10.  Neither the main effect of question order nor 
the interaction between processing condition and question order were significant, ps > .15.  
 Second, the influence of route of processing on participants’ performance on the 
ratio bias task was examined with three separate 3 (processing condition) X 2 (question 
order) between subjects ANCOVAs in which Time 1 measures of participants’ trait rationality 
and trait experientiality served as covariates. The dependent variables were participants’ 
confidence estimates for the 1/10, 10/100, and 9/100 odds questions. Results revealed 
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Table 3 
Study 1 Raw and Adjusted Means of Self-reported Rationality During Experimental session 
 
Reasoned  Control  Experiential  
Raw means  (SD)  5.06 
 (1.37) 
3.52  
(1.48) 
2.81 
 (1.23) 
Adjusted Means  (95% 
CI)  
4.99  
(4.51 – 5.47) 
3.56 
 (3.06 – 4.05) 
2.84 
 (2.30 – 3.39) 
Note. Self-reported rationality among participants assigned to the reasoned, control, and 
experiential processing conditions. Higher values indicate greater self-reported use of 
rational processing, whereas lower values indicate greater self-reported use of experiential 
processing. 
 
no significant main effects of route of processing condition or of question order, and no 
significant processing condition by question order interactions on participants’ confidence 
estimates for either the 1/10 or the 10/100 odds questions, all ps > .07, ηp2s < .03 (see Table 
4). Results also did not yield a significant main effect of route of processing or of question 
order on the 9/100 odds ratio, ps > .07, but did yield a significant processing condition by 
question order interaction, F (2, 82) = 4.62, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. Examination of the means 
(Table 3) indicated that participants in the reasoned processing condition reported less 
confidence for the 9/100 odds question in comparison to all other groups, but only when 
they answered the behavioral willingness items first. When they answered the behavioral 
intention items first, all groups reported similar levels of confidence for the 9/100 odds 
question. 
 The final set of analyses were conducted to examine the influence of route of 
processing and question order on participants’ response times with two separate 3 
(processing condition) X 2 (question order) between subjects ANOVAs. For these analyses, 
participants’ response times to the behavioral willingness and behavioral intention items 
served as the dependent variables. Response times reflected the average amount of time it 
took participants to read and respond to all questions within a set (i.e., all behavioral 
willingness questions or all behavioral intentions questions). As indicated in the Methods, 
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prior to performing these analyses, participants’ response times were inverse transformed to 
normalize the distribution. 
Table 4 
Study 1 Adjusted Descriptive Statistics of Confidence in Ratio-Bias Task by Processing 
Condition and Question Order 
 
Reasoned  Control  Experiential  
1/10 Odds ratio  BW first 2.77  
(2.11 – 3.43) 
3.99 
 (3.3 – 4.68) 
3.57 
 (2.85 – 4.29) 
 BI first 3.22  
(2.50 – 3.95) 
2.76 
 (2.02 – 3.51) 
2.97 
 (2.11 – 3.83) 
10/100 Odds 
ratio 
BW first 2.87  
(2.25 – 3.48) 
3.67 
 (3.04 – 4.31) 
3.71 
 (3.04 – 4.38) 
 BI first 3.41  
( 2.74 – 4.07) 
3.57 
 ( 2.88 – 4.25) 
3.30 
 (2.51 – 4.09) 
9/100 Odds ratio BW 
first 
1.95 
 (1.34 – 2.56) 
3.22 
 ( 2.59 – 3.85) 
3.72 
 (3.06 – 4.39) 
 BI first 3.03 
 (2.36 – 3.69) 
2.99 
 (2.31 – 3.67) 
2.73  
(1.94 – 3.52) 
Note. 95% confidence intervals reported in parentheses. Higher values reflect higher 
estimated confidence in each of the ratio bias lotteries. 
Covariates include rationality and experientiality from Rational Experiential Inventory. 
Means with different superscripts differ significantly at p < .05, †p < .10. 
 
 The analysis that examined response times to the behavioral willingness items 
yielded a significant main effect of processing condition, F (2, 133) = 7.50, p < .01, ηp2 = .10. 
Follow-up contrasts that used the LSD method revealed that participants in the reasoned 
condition (M= 6.21, SD = 3.39) responded significantly slower than participants in the 
experiential (M = 4.59, SD = 1.91) or control (M = 4.26, SD = 1.354) conditions, ps < .01. 
Participants in the experiential and control conditions did not significantly differ, p > .80. 
Results indicated no significant main effect of question order, nor a significant processing 
condition by question order interaction, ps > .07. The analysis that examined response times 
to the set of behavioral intentions items yielded no significant main effects of route of 
processing, of question order, and no significant route of processing by question order 
interaction, all ps > .06. The response times for the reasoned condition (M = 7.85, SD = 
3.51), experiential condition (M = 7.14, SD = 3.04) and the control conditions (M = 6.61, SD 
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= 2.00) were, however, mostly in the expected directions, except for participants in the 
control condition responding slightly faster than participants in the experiential condition. 
Overall, these findings are partially consistent with hypotheses, and suggest that the 
processing manipulation successfully affected the amount of time participants spent 
considering their behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors but did not affect 
the amount of time participants spent considering their intentions to engage in risk 
behaviors.   
Main Analyses 
Effect of processing condition and order on behavioral willingness: Having 
demonstrated that route of processing was effectively induced in participants, I next tested 
the hypothesis that people’s use of reasoned versus experiential processing influences their 
behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors. I first tested this hypothesized 
relation with two separate 3 (route of processing) X 2 (question order) ANCOVAs – one that 
used participants’ behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors as the 
dependent variable and another that used participants’ behavioral intentions to engage in 
health risk behaviors as the dependent variable (Table 7). In both analyses, Time 1 
measures of rationality and experientiality were included as covariates. As reported below, 
the results from these analyses were consistent with the hypothesis that route of processing 
influenced behavioral willingness more strongly than behavioral intentions. 
The analysis that focused on behavioral willingness yielded a significant main effect of 
processing condition, F (2, 78) = 6.33, p < .01, ηp2 = .14 (Table 8), but no significant main 
effect of question order, F (1, 78) = 1.34, p > .25, ηp2 =.02, nor a significant interaction 
between processing condition and question order, F (2, 78) = 2.93, p > .05, ηp2 = .07. Follow-
up contrasts that examined the significant main effect of processing condition revealed that 
participants in the reasoned condition reported significantly lower behavioral willingness to 
engage in health risk behaviors than participants in the control and experiential conditions, 
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ps < .05. Participants’ behavioral willingness  to engage in health risk behaviors in the 
experiential condition did not significantly differ from participants in the control condition, p > 
.05.The analysis that focused on behavioral intentions did not yield any significant effects, 
ps > .05, ηp2 < .02 (Table 8). These results provide the first empirical evidence that 
externally induced shifts in people’s route of processing affects their behavioral willingness 
to engage in health risk behaviors more than their behavioral intentions to engage in health 
risk behaviors, and that this effect may be strongest for people who are engaged in 
reasoned processing.  
Table 5 
 Study 1 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Question Order Response 
times for Behavioral Willingness 
Source Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig ηp
2
 
Corrected 
Model 
.125 5 .03 4.07 .01 .13 
Condition .092 2 .05 7.50 < .001 .90 
Order .02 1 .02 3.33 .07 .10 
Condition by 
order 
.01 2 .01 1.06 .35 .02 
Error .81 133 .01 
   
Corrected 
Total 
.94 138 
    
R square = 
.13 
 
Note. T1 BW refers to Time 1 behavioral willingness. Rational refers to the rationality score 
from Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Condition refers to processing manipulation condition. 
The previous findings suggested that the route of processing manipulation influenced 
participants’ behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors more than their 
behavioral intentions. To examine whether this difference was significant, a 3 (route of 
processing) X 2 (questionnaire order) between-subjects ANCOVA. The dependent variable 
was the difference between participants’ behavioral willingness and their behavioral 
intentions to engage in health risk behaviors (i.e. BW – BI). For this analysis, Time 1 
measures of rationality and experientiality were included as covariates as was the difference  
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Table 6 
 Study 1 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Question Order Response 
times for Behavioral Intentions 
Source Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig ηp
2
 
Corrected Model .02 5 .00 1.26 .29 .05 
Condition .01 2 .00 .99 .37 .02 
Order .01 1 .01 3.62 .06 .03 
Condition by 
order 
.00 2 .00 .03 .97 .00 
Error .33 133 .01 
   
Corrected 
Total 
.35 138 
    
R square = .13 
 
Note. T1 BW refers to Time 1 behavioral willingness. Rational refers to the rationality score 
from Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Condition refers to processing manipulation condition. 
Table 7 
Study 1 Adjusted Descriptive Statistics of Behavioral Willingness and Behavioral Intentions by 
Processing Condition and Questionnaire Order 
     Dependent Variable Condition BW first 95% CI BI First 95% CI 
Behavioral Willingness Reasoned -.27 -.60 - .06 -.34 -.68 - .01 
 
Control .12 -.16 - .40 .51 .12 - .90 
 
Experiential -.04 -.38 - .30 .04 -.33 - .40 
Behavioral Intentions Reasoned -.98 -1.52 - -.45 -.50 -1.06 - .06 
 
Control -.50 -1.03 - .03 -.62 -1.26 - .02 
 
Experiential -.42 -.92 - .08 -.45 -1.06 - .16 
Note. BW refers to behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions. 
Values adjusted for Time 1 measures of trait rationality and experientiality, and behavioral 
willingness and behavioral intentions (respectively). 
 
between behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions at Time 1. Results did not yield a 
significant main effect of route of processing, F (2, 63) = .64, p > .50, ηp2 = .02 (Table 10). 
There was, however, a significant main effect of question order, F (2, 63) = 12.77, p < .01, 
ηp
2
 =.12, such that participants who answered the behavioral willingness items first reported 
a significantly greater difference between behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions 
(M = .47) than participants who answered the behavioral intentions items first (M = -.38). 
That is, participants who answered behavioral willingness first reported greater behavioral 
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willingness than behavioral intentions, whereas participants who answered behavioral 
intentions first reported greater behavioral intentions than behavioral willingness. Finally, the 
results did not yield a significant route of processing by question order interaction, F (2, 63) 
= .64, p > .50, ηp2 = .01. In sum, the previously reported significant influence of route of 
processing on behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors was not significantly 
different from the influence of route of processing on behavioral intentions to engage in 
health risk behaviors. 
Table 8 
 Study 1 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Question Order on 
Behavioral Willingness 
Source Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig ηp
2
 
Corrected 
Model 
76.292 8 9.54 60.76 < .001 .86 
T1 BW 65.57 1 65.57 417.78 < .001 .84 
Rational .04 1 .04 .27 .60 <.01 
Experiential .27 1 .27 1.69 .20 .02 
Condition 1.99 2 1.99 6.33 <.01 .14 
Order .21 1 .21 1.34 .25 .02 
Condition by 
order 
.92 2 .46 2.93 .06 .07 
Error 12.24 78 .16 
   
Corrected 
Total 
88.53 86 
    
R square = .68 
 
Note. T1 BW refers to Time 1 behavioral willingness. Rational refers to the rationality score 
from Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Condition refers to processing manipulation condition. 
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Table 9 
 Study 1 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Question Order on 
Behavioral Intentions 
Source Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig ηp
2
 
Corrected 
Model 
124.44 8 15.55 17.84 <.001 .69 
T1 BI 112.58 1 112.58 129.09 < .001 .67 
Rational .4.26 1 4.28 4.91 .03 .07 
Experiential 10.78 1 10.78 12.36 <.001 .16 
Condition 1.07 2 .54 .61 .55 .02 
Order .21 1 .21 .24 .63 <.01 
Condition by 
order 
1.19 2 .60 .68 .51 .02 
Error 54.94 63 .87 
   
Corrected 
Total 
179.38 71 
    
R square = .69 
 
Note. T1 BI refers to Time 1 behavioral intentions. Rational refers to the rationality score 
from Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from the 
Rational  Experiential Inventory. Condition refers to processing manipulation condition.  
   
Table 10 
Study 1 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Questionnaire Order on Behavioral 
Willingness minus Behavioral Intentions 
Source Sum of squares df Mean Square F Sig ηp2 
Corrected Model 47.92 8 5.99 4.10 <.001 .34 
T1 BW-BI 30.31 1 30.31 20.75 <.001 .25 
Rational 4.57 1 4.57 1.10 .08 .05 
Experiential 1.59 1 1.59 1.09 .30 .02 
Processing Condition 1.86 2 .93 .64 .53 .02 
Order 12.78 1 12.78 8.75 <.01 .12 
Processing condition by 
order 
1.24 2 .62 .43 .66 .01 
Error 92.01 63 1.46 
   
Corrected Total 139.93 71 
    
R square = .34 
 
Note. T1 BW refers to Time 1 behavioral willingness. Rational refers to rationality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to experientiality score from the Rational 
Experiential Inventory. Condition refers to processing condition. 
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CHAPTER 6: STUDY 1 DISCUSSION 
 The primary goals of Study 1 were to 1) establish that route of processing can be 
effectively induced in a laboratory situation and 2) examine the effect that route of 
processing had on both analytical reasoning task performance and on health risk decisions. 
These goals were addressed by conducting an experiment in which a between-subjects 
manipulation of processing route was used, and participants’ behavioral willingness and 
behavioral intentions to engage in risky sexual and drinking behaviors was assessed. 
Overall, results of Study 1 suggest two conclusions: First, the between-subjects processing 
manipulation was successful in shifting participants’ reliance on either reasoned or 
experiential processing relative to a control group. Second, the findings supported dual-
process theory assumptions that riskier decisions reflect higher degrees of experiential 
processing. In addition, the findings supported the predictions expected from the prototype 
willingness model that the construct of behavioral willingness reflects experiential 
processing and is more malleable than the construct of behavioral intentions. The following 
sections provide elaboration on the findings and implications of Study 1. 
 Efficacy of processing manipulation. Because there have been no other experimental 
between-subjects manipulations of processing route, it was first necessary to examine the 
hypothesized effects of participants’ route of processing on three separate manipulation 
checks, including self-reported rationality during the experimental session, responses to the 
odds-ratio task, and finally differences in response times. First, participants’ self-reported 
reliance on reasoned or experiential processing was assessed with a single item question at 
the end of the experimental session. It was predicted that participants in the reasoned 
condition would report significantly higher levels of rationality than participants in the control 
and experiential conditions, and that the control condition participants would report 
significantly higher levels of rationality than the experiential condition participants. Results 
revealed a significant main effect of processing condition on self-reported rationality, while 
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controlling for trait measures of rationality and experientiality. In fact, effect size estimates 
(η2) reveal that approximately 28% of the total variance of self-reported rationality was 
attributable to the processing manipulation. This suggests that the processing manipulation 
had a relatively large effect on self-reported rationality during the experimental session. Pair-
wise processing condition comparisons revealed that the reasoned condition participants 
reported significantly higher rationality scores than the experiential condition and the control 
condition participants; however, the difference between the experiential and control 
conditions was marginally significant (p < .10).  
These findings have two implications; first, they suggest that participants’ reliance on 
reasoned vs. experiential processing is in fact malleable. Second, the pairwise comparisons 
suggest that the processing manipulation was more effective in inducing reasoned 
processing than experiential processing, although because the difference between the 
experiential and control group was marginally significant, replication is needed before firm 
conclusions can be drawn. Overall, examination of participants’ self-reported use of 
rationality or experientiality during the experimental session supported the hypothesis that 
route of processing can be experimentally manipulated, and suggested that the processing 
manipulation used in this study was effective, especially for participants who received the 
reasoned processing instructions.  
 The odds-ratio task was included in the present study because it is often used as an 
indicator of the degree to which participants are engaging in heuristic based decision 
making. Participants in other studies are often told to choose which task they would pick 
(1/10 vs. 10/100) or (1/10 vs. 9/100) and participants in those studies consistently chose the 
ratio with largest absolute values (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Participants in the current study 
were not told to choose which option they would prefer, but rather they were told to report 
their perceived confidence given those two odds ratios. It was hypothesized that participants 
in the experiential condition would report significantly higher confidence levels for the higher 
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absolute value ratios. There was partial support for this hypothesis. Although there were no 
significant differences across the processing conditions when examining the 1/10 or 10/100 
odds, there was a significant main effect of processing condition on confidence for the 9/100 
odds. Participants in other studies are reported to convey knowledge that the odds are equal 
(in the 1/10 vs. 10/100 scenario) or even worse (in the 9/100) scenario, but that they “feel” 
that the odds are better given higher absolute numbers. This effect was partially found in the 
current study, and offer support for the claim that participants in the reasoned condition were 
making less heuristically based decisions than the experiential condition. 
 Finally, the hypothesized effects of the processing manipulation on response times 
were examined. It was predicted that participants in the reasoned condition would respond 
to the questionnaire items significantly slower than the control and experiential conditions, 
and that participants in the control condition would respond significantly slower than 
participants in the experiential condition. Examining response times is an important 
determinant of route of processing because every dual-processing theory of which I am 
aware argues that analytic responding is much slower than experiential processing (Evans, 
2007). This hypothesis was partially supported in the current study. As predicted, there was 
a significant main effect of processing condition for participants’ behavioral willingness to 
engage in risky health behaviors, but unexpectedly, no significant effect of processing 
condition on behavioral intentions to engage in risky health behaviors. Furthermore, the 
predicted significant differences between the control and experiential conditions were not 
found. Participants in the reasoned condition did respond significantly slower than the other 
two conditions, but only when answering the behavioral willingness items. One possible 
explanation for these findings is that because behavioral intentions is less affected by 
situational factors than behavioral willingness, the main effect of route of processing on 
response times is only evident for the behavioral willingness measures (Gibbons, Gerrard, & 
Lane, 2003). It is possible that manipulating route of processing only affects response times 
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when considering novel scenarios, and not when reporting behavioral intentions that have 
likely already been established. In sum, the hypothesized effect of processing route on 
processing time was partially supported. 
 Effect of processing condition on risk cognitions. It was hypothesized that the 
processing manipulation would significantly affect willingness to engage in casual sex and 
alcohol consumption. Because behavioral intentions is proposed to be a more stable 
construct, no main effect of processing manipulation on behavioral intentions was expected. 
Overall, there was support for this hypothesis. There was a significant main effect of 
processing condition on behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors when 
controlling for trait measures of rationality and experientiality. Examination of results (Table 
8) indicated that even though the baseline measures of behavioral willingness was the 
strongest predictor of behavioral willingness, the processing condition also significantly 
affected behavioral willingness, accounting for an additional 11% of the variance. Follow-up 
contrasts revealed that participants given the reasoned processing instructions reported 
significantly lower behavioral willingness than participants given the experiential processing 
or control instructions. Participants in the experiential and control groups, however, did not 
significantly differ. This finding is important because it offers empirical support for the 
assumption that less risky decisions are the result of more reasoned decision making, while 
more risky decisions are the result of less reasoned decision making. It was also expected 
that the processing manipulation would not significantly affect behavioral intentions to 
engage in health risk behaviors. As hypothesized there was not a significant effect of 
processing condition on behavioral intentions to engage in health risk behaviors.  
 Effect of question order on health risk cognitions. Previous research has 
demonstrated that participants’ responses to behavioral willingness and behavioral 
intentions are influenced by the order in which participants are presented with the questions. 
Specifically, behavioral willingness tends to be higher when it is answered before behavioral 
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intentions are assessed (Reimer, 2006). It is proposed that considering the behavioral 
intentions items can induce more reasoned processing. Therefore, the presentation of the 
behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions items in the current study were 
counterbalanced. It was hypothesized that participants who responded to the behavioral 
willingness items first would report significantly higher behavioral willingness than 
participants who answered the behavioral intentions items first. Analyses revealed there was 
not a consistent significant main effect of question order on behavioral willingness. There 
was one significant finding, such that participants who answered the behavioral willingness 
items first (always sex before alcohol) reported higher behavioral willingness to drink, than 
participants who answered the behavioral intentions items first. Therefore, this hypothesis 
was only partially supported. It is possible that the order effects expected in this study were 
not found because the explicit processing instructions given to participants were more 
powerful than any questionnaire order effects. 
 Effect of processing condition and question order. A significant interaction between 
processing manipulation condition and questionnaire order was expected, such that 
participants given the reasoned processing manipulation and who answered the behavioral 
intentions items first were expected to report the lowest behavioral willingness while 
participants who were given the experiential processing instructions and who answered 
behavioral willingness first, were expected to report the highest behavioral willingness to 
engage in health risk behaviors. Overall, there was only partial support for this hypothesis. 
There was a nearly significant interaction effect on behavioral willingness to engage in 
health risk behavior. Follow up contrasts between processing conditions revealed that 
participants in the experiential condition who answered the behavioral willingness items first 
reported the highest behavioral willingness whereas participants in the reasoned condition 
who answered behavioral intentions first reported the lowest behavioral willingness. 
Therefore, while there was not a consistent significant main effect of order, there did appear 
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to be a nearly significant interaction effect between processing manipulation and 
questionnaire order.    
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CHAPTER 7: STUDY 2 OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Study Two Overview 
 The goals of Study 2 were to replicate the effects of the processing condition found 
in Study 1, and to examine if these effects were mediated by other theoretically relevant 
factors. Specifically, Study 2 examined whether participants’ motivation to have sex and 
outcome expectancies related to alcohol use mediated the influence of route of processing 
on their subsequent health risk decisions. These hypotheses were tested with a 3 
(Processing condition: reasoned vs. experiential vs. control) X 2 (question order: BW then BI 
first vs. Outcome expectancy first) factorial design. The processing manipulation was a 
between-subjects factor, while questionnaire order was a within-subjects factor. Processing 
route was manipulated following the procedures described in Study 1: participants were 
instructed to answer a variety of questions in one of three ways 1) strictly logical responding 
2) gut level intuitive responding or 3) as they themselves would normally respond. 
Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to receive one of two questionnaire 
orders. Half of the participants answered all BW and BI items (with BW always preceding BI) 
prior to answering the questions related to motives and outcome expectancies whereas the 
other half of participants answered the questions related to motives and outcome 
expectancy prior to the BW and BI items.  
Study Two Hypotheses 
 Study 2 was designed to examine four specific hypotheses. I describe these 
hypotheses in the following sections.  
 Route of processing. It was first hypothesized that the route of processing 
manipulation would influence participants’ behavioral willingness to engage in health risk 
behaviors more so than behavioral intentions. These two hypothesized main effects of 
processing route are the same as in Study 1; therefore they will not be reiterated here. 
  
 
46
Mediated effects. The third hypothesis of study 2 addresses the expected mediation of 
route of processing by outcome expectancies for drinking and motives to engage in sex. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants in the reasoned condition would report 
significantly lower behavioral willingness than participants in either the control or experiential 
conditions, and that this effect would be mediated by participants’ motives to have sex and 
outcome expectancies for alcohol use. In addition it was expected that those in the 
experiential condition would report significantly greater behavioral willingness than 
participants in the reasoned and control conditions, and that this effect would be mediated 
by participants’ motives to have sex and outcome expectancies for alcohol use.   
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CHAPTER 8: STUDY 2 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Experimental Design 
 Participants were randomly assigned to a 3 (Processing condition: reasoned, vs. 
experiential vs. control) X 2 (Order: BW first vs. outcome expectancies first) mixed model 
experimental design. The three route of processing conditions were the same as in Study 1. 
Participants randomly assigned to the behavioral willingness first condition were presented 
with the behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions items (always BW prior to BI) 
before the motives and outcome expectancy items. Participants randomly assigned to the 
expectancy first condition were presented with the motives and outcome expectancy 
questions (sexual outcome expectancy always preceding alcohol outcome expectancy) prior 
to the behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions items. 
Participants 
 Participants, (N = 204, 70% female) were recruited from introductory level 
psychology courses at Iowa State University. Participant eligibility, recruitment, and sign-up 
procedures were the same as in study one (see Table 13 for cell count by experimental 
condition). Eighty seven percent of the participants were Caucasian, and reported a mean 
age of 19.4 years. 
Table 11 
Study 2 Cell Counts by Experimental Condition 
 
Reasoned Control Experiential 
Behavioral 
willingness First 
36 33 48 
Outcome 
expectancies First 
31 32 24 
Note. Reasoned refers to the reasoned processing condition, Control refers to the Control 
condition, and Experiential refers to the experiential processing condition. 
 
Measures 
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 The questionnaire assessed participants’ past sexual and alcohol use behaviors, 
individual differences in processing style, and participants’ behavioral willingness and 
behavioral intentions to engage in risky sexual and alcohol consumption behaviors in the 
future. Each of these measures is described next.  
 Past behavior. Participants completed a series of items that assessed their previous 
sexual experiences and previous alcohol consumption. Participants respond to these items 
on 10-point Likert type scales with anchors 1 (zero casual sexual partners) and 10 (10 or 
more casual sexual partners), or 1 (never) and 10 (12 or more times this month) for sexual 
and drinking behaviors, respectively.    
 Individual differences in processing style. The Rational-Experiential Inventory 
(Appendix B; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) was used to measure individual differences in the 
tendency to rely on either reasoned or experiential processing when making decisions in 
everyday life. These measures were the same as in Study 1. These measures showed high 
levels of internal reliability for the rationality (α= .85) and experientiality (α = .87) scales. 
 Behavioral intentions. Participants completed a series of six items designed to 
assess their behavioral intentions to engage in risky health behaviors. Two of these items 
focused on risky sexual behaviors (e.g., sex with a casual partner) whereas the remaining 4 
items focused on risky alcohol consumption (e.g., going out with the intention of getting 
drunk). These measures were the same as in Study 1 (Appendix C). Internal reliabilities for 
Time 1 (α = .98) and Time 2 (α = .97) drinking behavioral intentions were quite high. 
Behavioral intentions to engage in casual sex items also showed high internal reliability at 
Time 1 (α = .96) and Time 2, (α = .96). All behavioral intentions measures were combined to 
reflect an overall measure of behavioral intentions to engage in health risk behaviors. 
 Behavioral willingness. Participants were asked to read a series of hypothetical 
scenarios in which they encounter the opportunity to engage in health risk behaviors. These 
scenarios were the same as in Study 1 (Appendix C). Behavioral willingness to engage in 
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casual sex at Time 1 (α = .89) and Time 2 (α = .88) were reliable indices. Behavioral 
willingness to drink also showed high internal reliabilities at both time points (α = .87 and α = 
.91 respectively). All behavioral willingness measures were combined to reflect an overall 
measure of behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors. 
 Motives and outcome expectancies. Participants’ motives to have sex and their 
outcome expectancies for drinking alcohol were also measured (Appendix C). A series of 12 
reasons why one may want to engage in sexual activity, and 10 reasons why one may not 
choose to engage in sexual activity were presented. Participants reported the degree to 
which they would consider each when deciding to engage in hypothetical sexual behavior in 
the future on a 5-point Likert type scale with anchors 1 (No, definitely would not) and 5 (Yes, 
it definitely would). These items were adapted from an extensive survey of why humans 
have sex (Meston & Buss, 2007).  Alcohol outcome expectancies were also assessed. 
Participants responded to 12 positive for, and 10 negative expectancies associated with 
drinking alcohol, on the same scale as above. These items were adapted from previous 
work examining outcome expectancies for alcohol consumption (Brown, Christiansen, & 
Goldman, 1987). Items were combined to represent total values (i.e., the sum) for both 
motives for engaging in, and for not engaging in sexual behaviors, and positive and negative 
alcohol outcome expectancies. The total values for motives for not engaging in sex were 
then subtracted from the total value of motives for engaging in sex. Likewise, the total 
values for negative alcohol outcome expectancies were subtracted from the total value of 
positive alcohol outcome expectancies. Therefore positive values reflect more positive 
motives and outcome expectancies. The motives for engaging in (α = .80), and for not 
engaging in sexual behavior (α = .73) had acceptable levels of internal reliability. Positive 
alcohol outcome expectancies were highly reliable (α = .91), as were the negative alcohol 
outcome expectancies (α = .87).  
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Response time. Response time in milliseconds was collected for all questionnaire 
items. Response times were aggregated into indices reflecting average response time for 
behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions to engage in health risk behaviors.   
Procedure 
 The procedures used in Study 2 were almost identical the procedures used in Study 
1. Data collection occurred at two time points, during the psychology departments’ mass 
testing session (Time 1) and during the experimental session (Time 2). It should be noted, 
however, that due to the timing of mass testing for Study 2, many participants completed 
mass testing after participating in the experiment. Potential participants were told that the 
experiment was designed to examine decision making processes and that they would be 
asked to make a series of decisions related to college students’ attitudes and behaviors. If 
they agreed to participate, they were led to a private room and seated at a computer screen 
and keyboard and the experimental session began. MediaLab software was used to present 
the questionnaire items and record the responses, including response times, for all 
questionnaire items. The processing manipulation was delivered at the beginning of the 
experimental session in the same fashion as Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the same three processing conditions, reasoned, experiential, or control. After the 
processing manipulation was delivered, participants began to the questionnaire. All 
participants responded to all of the same questionnaire items; however participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two questionnaire order conditions, the behavioral willingness 
first condition versus the expectancies / motives first condition. Participants assigned to the 
behavioral willingness first condition answered the behavioral willingness and behavioral 
intentions items first (always behavioral willingness before behavioral intentions, and always 
sex before alcohol), whereas those assigned to the expectations first condition answered 
the motives and outcome expectancy items first followed by the behavioral willingness and 
behavioral intentions items. Sex motives were always presented first, followed by the 
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alcohol outcome expectancies, however, the order of the positive and negative qualities 
within each behavior was randomly presented (i.e., randomized within groups).  
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CHAPTER 9: STUDY 2 RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Descriptive statistics. The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all Time 1 
and Time 2 variables are presented in Table 12. Tables E1, E2, and E3 in Appendix E 
present the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all Time 1 and Time 2 variables 
for the reasoned, experiential, and control conditions separately. Overall, participants at 
Time 1 reported low to moderate behavioral willingness to have casual sex (M = 5.4) and 
very low behavioral intentions to have casual sex in the future (M = 3.9). Specifically, 69% of 
the sample reported ever having been sexually active. These participants reported between 
1 and 12 or more lifetime sexual partners (M = 2), and less than 1 casual sexual partner. 
Participants also reported relatively low behavioral willingness to drink alcohol (M = 7.5) and 
low to moderate intentions to drink in the future (M = 7.8). Specifically, 73% of the sample 
reported some alcohol use in the past month. Within this time frame, these participants 
reported between 1 and 12 or more servings of alcohol (M = 4), and between 1 and 12 or 
more episodes of binge drinking. Based on these descriptive statistics, the sample for Study 
2 appears to be similar to the sample for Study 1.
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Table 12 
Study 2 Correlations and Descriptive statistics 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Rational 1 
193 
.09 
186 
-.01 
192 
.09 
193 
-.13† 
191 
-.20** 
193 
-.05 
189 
-.06 
193 
-.08 
191 
-.14† 
193 
-.01 
193 
-.19* 
193 
2. Experiential  1 
192 
-.03 
191 
-.06 
192 
.16* 
190 
.13† 
192 
-.08 
188 
-.07 
192 
.17* 
191 
.14* 
192 
.10 
192 
.11 
192 
3. Casual sex BW (Time 1) 1 
198 
.81*** 
198 
.37*** 
196 
.30*** 
198 
.69*** 
195 
.61*** 
198 
.37*** 
196 
.24*** 
198 
.59*** 
198 
.27*** 
198 
4. Casual sex BW (Time 2)  1 
204 
.25*** 
197 
.24*** 
204 
.56*** 
195 
.59*** 
204 
.27*** 
197 
.20** 
204 
.62*** 
204 
.22** 
204 
5. Drinking BW (Time 1)   1 
197 
.73*** 
197 
.40*** 
193 
.43*** 
197 
.73*** 
195 
.66*** 
197 
.35*** 
197 
.53*** 
197 
6. Drinking BW (Time 2)    1 
204 
.35*** 
195 
.33*** 
204 
.64*** 
197 
.68*** 
204 
.32*** 
204 
.58*** 
204 
7. Casual sex BI (Time 1)     1 
195 
.81*** 
195 
.44*** 
193 
.31*** 
195 
.42*** 
195 
.31*** 
195 
8. Casual sex BI (Time 2)      1 
204 
.37*** 
197 
.35*** 
204 
.45*** 
204 
.34*** 
204 
9. Drinking BI (Time 1)       1 
197 
.81*** 
197 
.34*** 
197 
.60*** 
197 
10. Drinking BI (Time 2)        1 
204 
.30*** 
204 
.70*** 
204 
11. Sex expectancies         1 
204 
.42*** 
204 
12. Alcohol expectancies          1 
204 
Mean 
(SD) 
35.43 
(6.82) 
34.4 
(6.31) 
5.42 
(3.93) 
5.97 
(3.81) 
7.54 
(3.52) 
7.84 
(3.65) 
3.93 
(3.45) 
3.97 
(3.38) 
7.75 
(4.81) 
16.6 
(9.28) 
5.43 
(10.51) 
4.14 
(12.40) 
Note. Sample sizes are reported on diagonal. Rational refers to the rationality score from the Rational Experiential 
Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from Rational Experiential Inventory. BW refers to 
behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions.  †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Testing for random assignment to condition. Preliminary analyses were performed to 
examine whether random assignment to the processing and question order conditions had 
been achieved. These analyses tested whether processing condition and question order had 
significant effects on any of the Time 1 measures. These potential effects were assessed 
separately in a series of one-way ANOVAs in which the following Time 1 measures served 
as the dependent variables: rationality, experientiality, behavioral willingness to have casual 
sex, behavioral willingness to drink alcohol, behavioral intentions to have casual sex, and 
behavioral intentions to drink alcohol. Results that examined the effect of processing 
condition yielded one significant finding. There was a significant main effect of processing 
condition on the Time 1 measure of behavioral willingness to drink alcohol, F (2, 194) = 
3.05, p = .05. Participants in the experiential condition showed higher behavioral willingness 
(M = 8.37) than did participants in the reasoned (M = 6.84) or control (M = 7.51) conditions. 
No other significant effects emerged, Fs < .50, ps > .10. Results that examined the effect of 
question order yielded no significant effects on any of the Time 1 measures, Fs (1, 196) < 
1.7, ps > .20. Although these results suggest that random assignment to the conditions had 
been achieved, the one significant difference between the processing conditions with 
respect to behavioral willingness to drink alcohol suggests that controlling for Time 1 
measures is advisable in order to draw firm conclusions about the effects of route of 
processing on changes in participants’ behavioral willingness to drink alcohol.   
Manipulation check: Processing condition. To test the effectiveness of the route of 
processing manipulation, two analyses were performed, with follow-up contrasts that used 
the LSD method. First, the influence of route of processing on participants’ self-reported 
rationality was examined with a 3 (processing condition) X 2 (question order) between 
subjects ANCOVA in which Time 1 measures of participants’ trait rationality and trait 
experientiality served as covariates. Results revealed a significant main effect of processing 
condition on self-reported rationality, F (2, 185) = 38.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .30. Follow-up 
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contrasts revealed that all of the means significantly differed from one another, ps < .01. 
Thus, self-reported rationality differed in the expected direction for all three groups, and 
those differences were statistically significant. Neither the main effect of question order, nor 
the interaction between processing condition and question order were significant, ps > .32.  
These results, which replicate the findings of Study 1, show that the processing condition 
manipulation shifted participants’ reliance on reasoned versus experiential processing 
thereby suggesting that people’s reliance on route of processing is in fact malleable.   
Table 13  
Study 2 Raw and Adjusted Descriptive Statistics of Self-reported Rationality during 
Experimental session 
 
Reasoned Control Experiential 
Raw means (SD) 4.79 
 (1.29) 
3.42 
 (1.44) 
2.75  
(1.38) 
Adjusted Means (95% CI) 4.78  
(4.45 – 5.12) 
3.46  
(3.13 – 3.78) 
2.65 
 (2.29 – 3.0) 
Note. Self-reported rationality among participants assigned to the reasoned, control, and 
experiential processing conditions. Higher values indicate greater self-reported use of 
rational processing, whereas lower values indicate greater self-reported use of experiential 
processing. 
     
 Second, I examined the influence of the route of processing manipulation on 
participants’ response times with two separate 3 (processing condition) X 2 (question order) 
between subjects ANOVAs. In these analyses, participants’ response times to the 
behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions items served as the dependent variables. 
As in Study 1, response times reflected the average amount of time it took participants to 
read and respond to all questions within a set, which were inverse transformed prior to 
analysis.  
The analysis that examined response times to the set of behavioral willingness 
measures yielded a significant main effect of processing condition, F (2, 198) = 13.57, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .12 (see Table 14). Follow-up contrasts that used the LSD method revealed that 
participants in the reasoned (M = 6.79, SD = 5.365) condition responded significantly slower 
than participants in the experiential (M = 4.76, SD = 1.87) and control conditions (M = 4.24, 
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SD = 1.25), ps < .001. Participants in the experiential and control conditions did not 
significantly differ, p > .30. Results indicated no significant main effect of question order nor 
a significant processing condition by question order interaction, ps > .07.  
Table 14 
Study 2 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Question Order on Response 
Times for Behavioral Willingness 
Source Sum of 
squares df Mean Square F Sig ηp
2
 
Corrected Model .19 5 .04 6.15 <.001 .13 
Condition .16 2 .08 13.57 <.001 .12 
Order .02 1 .02 3.31 .07 .02 
Condition by Order .00 2 .00 .11 .90 .00 
Error 1.20 198 .01 
   
Corrected Total 1.38 203 
    
R square = .15 
 
 
The analysis that examined response times to the set of behavioral intentions items 
yielded a significant main effect of processing condition, F (2, 198) = 6.09, p < .01, ηp2 = .09, 
a significant main effect of question order, F (1, 198) = 7.21, p < .01, ηp2 = .04, but no 
significant interaction between these variables, F (2, 198) = .61, p > .50, ηp2 = .01 (see Table 
15). Follow-up contrasts that examined the significant main effects with the LSD method 
revealed that (a) participants in the reasoned condition (M = 7.51, SD = 2.87) responded 
significantly slower than participants in the experiential (M = 6.31, SD = 1.90) and control 
conditions (M = 6.54, SD = 3.13), ps < .01; (b) participants in the experiential and control 
conditions did not significantly differ, p > .90, and; (c) participants who answered the 
behavioral willingness items first (M = 7.18, SD = 2.98) responded significantly slower than 
participants who answered the behavioral intentions items first (M = 6.26, SD = 2.20) , p < 
.01. This main effect of question order is not in the hypothesized direction. Overall, the 
findings for response times are consistent with hypotheses, and suggest that the route of 
processing manipulation successfully affected the amount of time participants spent making 
decisions during the questionnaire, and perhaps more so for participants in the reasoned 
conditions.  
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Main Analyses 
 Effect of processing condition and order on behavioral willingness: Having provided 
evidence that route of processing was effectively induced in participants, I next tested the 
hypothesis that people’s use of reasoned versus experiential processing influences their 
behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors. This hypothesized relation was 
first tested with two separate 3 (route of processing) X 2 (question order) ANCOVAs, one 
that used participants’ behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors as the 
dependent variable the second that used participants’ behavioral intentions to engage in 
health risk behaviors as the dependent variable. In both analyses, Time 1 measures of 
rationality and experientiality were included as covariates. The results from these analyses 
were consistent with the hypothesis that route of processing influences behavioral 
willingness more strongly than behavioral intentions (Table 16). Specifically, the analysis 
Table 15 
Study 2 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Condition and Order on Response Time to Behavioral 
Intentions 
Source Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig ηp
2
 
Corrected Model .06 5 .01 3.79 <.01 .09 
Condition .04 2 .02 6.09 <.01 .06 
Order .02 1 .02 7.21 <.01 .04 
Condition by Order .00 2 .00 .61 .54 .01 
Error .57 198 .00 
   
Corrected Total .63 203 
    
R square = .08 
 
 
that examined behavioral willingness yielded a significant main effect of processing 
condition, F (2, 177) = 6.56, p < .01, ηp2 = .07 (Table 17), but no significant main effect of 
question order, F (1, 177) = 6.0, p > .30, ηp2 < .01, nor a significant interaction between 
processing condition and question order, F (2, 177) = .89, p > .40, ηp2 < .01. Follow-up 
contrasts that examined the significant main effect of processing condition with the LSD 
method revealed that participants in the reasoned condition reported significantly lower 
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Table 16 
Study 1 Adjusted Descriptive Statistics of Behavioral Willingness and Behavioral Intentions 
by Processing Condition and Questionnaire Order 
     Dependent 
Variable 
Condition BW 
first 
95% CI Expectancies 
first 
95% CI 
Behavioral Willingness Reasoned -.27 -.60 - .06 -.34 -.68 - .01 
 
Control .12 -.16 - .40 .51 .12 - .90 
 
Experiential -.04 -.38 - .30 .04 -.33 - .40 
Behavioral Intentions Reasoned -.13 .-47 - .21 -.13 -.49 - .22 
 
Control -.04 -.33 - .25 .28 -.12 - .68 
 
Experiential -.20 -.55 - .16 .32 -.06 - .69 
Note. BW refers to behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions. 
Values adjusted for Time 1 measures of trait rationality and experientiality, and behavioral 
willingness and behavioral intentions (respectively). 
 
behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors than participants in the control 
condition, p < .001. No other contrasts were significant, ps > .05. The analysis that focused 
on behavioral intentions did not yield any significant effects, ps > .05, ηp2 s < .02 (Table 18). 
In sum, these results indicate that there was a significant effect of the processing condition 
on participants’ behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors, but not their 
behavioral intentions to engage in these behaviors, thereby replicating the results of Study 
1. 
The above findings indicated that route of processing influenced participants’ 
behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors, but not behavioral intentions. To 
examine whether these differential effects were significant, one final analysis was 
performed: A 3 (route of processing) X 2 (questionnaire order) between-subjects ANCOVA. 
The dependent variable was the difference between participants’ behavioral willingness and 
their behavioral intentions (i.e. BW – BI). For this analysis, Time 1 measures of rationality 
and experientiality were included as covariates as was the difference between behavioral 
willingness and behavioral intentions at Time 1. This analysis did not yield any significant 
effects, ps > 05 (Table 20). Accordingly, the reported significant effect of route of processing 
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Table 17 
Study 2 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Questionnaire Order on 
Behavioral Willingness 
Source Sum of 
squares df Mean Square F Sig ηp
2
 
Corrected Model 312.46 8 39.06 44.06 < .001 .67 
T1 BW 279.60 1 279.60 315.38 <.001 .64 
Rational .02 1 .02 .06 .87 <.01 
Experiential .10 1 .10 .11 .74 <.01 
Processing Condition 11.62 2 5.81 6.56 <.01 .07 
Order .80 1 .80 .90 .35 <.01 
Processing condition by 
order 
1.57 2 .79 .89 .41 <.01 
Error 156.92 177 .89 
   
Corrected Total 469.38 185 
    
R square = .66 
 
Note. T1 BW refers to Time 1 behavioral willingness. Rational refers to rationality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to experientiality score from the Rational 
Experiential Inventory. Condition refers to processing condition. 
 
Table 18 
Study 2 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Question Order on Behavioral 
Intentions 
Source Sum of squares df Mean Square F Sig ηp2 
Corrected Model 357.42 8 44.68 47.36 < .001 .68 
T1 BI 315.92 1 315.92 334.92 <.001 .65 
Rational 1.48 1 1.48 1.57 .21 <.01 
Experiential .00 1 .00 .00 .98 <.01 
Processing Condition 2.04 2 1.02 1.08 .34 .01 
Order 3.45 1 3.45 3.66 .06 .02 
Processing condition by 
order 
2.04 2 1.02 1.08 .34 .01 
Error 166.96 177 .94 
   
Corrected Total 524.38 18 
    
R square = .68 
 
Note. T1 BI refers to Time 1 behavioral intentions. Rational refers to rationality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to experientiality score from the Rational 
Experiential Inventory. Condition refers to processing condition. 
 
on behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behaviors was not significantly different 
from the effect of route of processing on behavioral intentions to engage in health risk 
behaviors. 
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Effect of processing condition: Mediation analyses. The next set of analyses 
examined two potential mediators of the effect of route of processing on behavioral 
willingness to engage in health risk behaviors. For these analyses, I separately examined 
behavioral willingness to engage in sexual behaviors and behavioral willingness to drink 
alcohol. With respect to sex, I focused on motivation to engage in sex as the potential 
mediator. With respect to alcohol use, I focused on outcome expectancies as the potential 
mediator. I examined these hypothesized relations with a bootstrapping procedure 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) that tested the indirect effect of processing condition on 
behavioral willingness through each hypothesized mediator (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The 
bootstrapping procedure that I used is recommended over other tests of indirect effects such 
as the Sobel method because the former possess higher statistical power, fewer 
assumptions (e.g., normality), better control over Type I error, and is less conservative 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets, 2002; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & 
Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Consistent with recommendations (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008), 3,000 bootstrap samples were generated for each analysis. 
To test these mediational effects, two dummy coded variables were created. The first 
contrast (referred to as contrast A) compared the reasoned condition (reasoned = 0) against 
the control and experiential conditions (experiential = 1, control = 1). The second contrast 
(referred to as contrast B) compared the experiential condition (experiential = 0) against the 
reasoned and control conditions (reasoned = 1, control = 1). This series of analyses was 
conducted four times, first using contrast A as the independent to predict behavioral 
willingness to have casual sex via motivation to have sex, and second using contrast B as 
the independent variable to predict behavioral willingness to have casual sex via motivation 
to have sex. Third, contrast A was used as the independent variable to predict behavioral 
willingness to drink alcohol via alcohol outcome expectancies, and fourth contrast B was 
used as the independent variable to predict behavioral willingness to drink alcohol via 
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Table 19 
Study 2 ANCOVA Table for Effect of Processing Condition and Questionnaire Order on 
Behavioral Willingness minus Behavioral Intentions 
Source Sum of 
squares df Mean Square F Sig ηp
2
 
Corrected Model 71.35 8 8.92 6.68 <.001 .23 
T1 BW-BI 62.17 1 62.17 46.58 <.001 .21 
Rational 2.15 1 2.15 1.61 .21 <.01 
Experiential .03 1 .03 .02 .88 <.01 
Processing Condition 4.15 2 2.08 1.56 .21 .02 
Order .63 1 .63 .47 .49 <.01 
Processing condition by 
order 
2.06 2 1.03 .77 .46 <.01 
Error 236.27 177 1.34 
   
Corrected Total 307.61 185 
    
R square = .23 
 
Note. T1 BW refers to Time 1 behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions. Rational 
refers to rationality score from the Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to 
experientiality score from the Rational Experiential Inventory. Condition refers to processing 
condition. 
   
alcohol outcome expectancies. All contrasts included as covariates the Time 1 measures of 
behavioral willingness to have casual sex and drink alcohol, respectively, and Time 1 
measures of rationality and experientiality. The direct and indirect effects of these contrasts 
are reported in Figures 1 through 4. Tables F1 and F2 in Appendix F present the total and 
direct effects of processing condition on behavioral willingness to have casual sex (Table 
F1) and drink alcohol (Table F2) separately for contrast A and contrast B. Also reported in 
these tables are the direct effects of the hypothesized mediators on behavioral willingness to 
have casual sex. 
Results that tested contrast A indicated that participants in the reasoned condition 
reported significantly less behavioral willingness to have casual sex, and significantly less 
motivation to have sex than participants in the other two conditions combined (see Figure 1). 
The main effect of motivation to have sex on behavioral willingness was also significant, 
such that greater motivation to have sex was associated with more behavioral willingness to 
have casual sex. Finally, the indirect effect of contrast A on behavioral willingness to have 
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casual sex through participants’ motivation to have sex was significant. Specifically, the 
bootstrapping test of indirect effects yielded a bias-corrected, accelerated 95% confidence 
interval that excluded zero (.04 to .58). In contrast, the results that tested contrast B 
indicated that participants in the experiential condition did not significantly differ from 
participants in the other two conditions combined with respect to their behavioral willingness 
to have casual sex or their motivation to have sex, ps > .50. In addition, with respect the test 
of mediation, the bootstrapping test of indirect effects yielded a bias-corrected, accelerated 
95% confidence interval that included zero (-.29 to .17). These results indicate that, relative 
to participants in the control condition, the motivation to have sex mediated the influence of 
reasoned processing on participants’ behavioral willingness to have sex but did not mediate 
the influence of experiential processing on their behavioral willingness to have sex. 
Figure 1 
Mediation of effect of Contrast A on Casual Sex Behavioral Willingness by Sex Outcome 
Expectancies 
 
Note. Model includes Time 1 casual sex behavioral willingness, rationality and experientiality 
as covariates. 
 
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
 
Results that tested contrast A for alcohol indicated that participants in the reasoned 
condition reported significantly less behavioral willingness to drink alcohol, and significantly 
more negative outcome expectancies than participants in the other two conditions (see 
Figure 2). The main effect of outcome expectancies on behavioral willingness was also 
Contrast A  
(Reasoned 
condition= 0) 
Casual Sex 
Behavioral 
Willingness 
Motivation to 
have sex 
b = 3.29* 
b = .08*** 
b = .82* (.57† ) 
  
 
63
significant, such that more negative outcome expectancies were associated with less 
behavioral willingness to drink alcohol. However, the indirect effect of contrast A on 
behavioral willingness to drink alcohol through participants’ outcome expectancies was not 
significant, as indicated by the fact that the bootstrapping test of indirect effects yielded a 
bias-corrected, accelerated 95% confidence interval that included zero (-.06 to .51). Results 
that tested contrast B indicated that participants in the experiential condition did not differ 
significantly from participants in the other two processing conditions with respect to their 
behavioral willingness to drink alcohol, but did report significantly less negative outcome 
expectancies with respect to alcohol use (Figure 3). The main effect of outcome 
expectancies on behavioral willingness was also significant, such that more negative 
outcome expectancies for alcohol use were associated with less behavioral willingness to 
drink alcohol. Finally, the indirect effect of contrast B on behavioral willingness to drink 
alcohol through participants’ outcome expectancies was significant. Specifically, the 
bootstrapping test of indirect effects yielded a bias-corrected, accelerated 95% confidence 
interval that excluded zero (-.67 to -.04). These results indicate that participants’ alcohol 
outcome expectancies did not mediate the influence of reasoned processing on their 
behavioral willingness to drink alcohol but did mediate the influence of experiential 
processing on their behavioral willingness to drink alcohol. 
Effect of processing condition on health risk behaviors: Moderated mediation. Next, a 
series of analyses were conducted to examine if the significant mediational relations 
reported above were moderated by question order. Following the procedures recommended 
by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007), these analyses tested for conditional indirect 
effects while controlling for the effects of covariates on both the mediator variable and the 
dependent variable. The covariates were Time 1 measures of rationality and experientiality  
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Figure 2 
Mediation of effect of Contrast A on Drinking Behavioral Willingness by Drinking Outcome 
Expectancies 
 
Note. Model includes Time 1 drinking behavioral willingness, rationality and experientiality 
as covariates. 
 
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
  
plus Time 1 measures of either behavioral willingness to have sex or behavioral willingness 
to drink alcohol. The independent variables were the same two dummy coded variables 
used in the previous series of analyses (contrast A where 0=reasoned 1=experiential and 
control and contrast B where 0=experiential, 1=reasoned and control). These analyses 
examined whether question order moderated relations between (1) each contrast (contrast 
A and B) and each hypothesized mediator (motivation to have sex and alcohol outcome 
expectancies) and (2) each hypothesized mediator and each outcome variable (behavioral 
willingness to have sex and behavioral willingness to drink alcohol). These relations were 
tested with product terms that I created by multiplying question order by each contrast (i.e., 
question order X contrast A and question order X contrast B) and by multiplying question 
order by each hypothesized mediator (i.e., question order x motivation to have sex and 
question order x alcohol outcome expectancies). The results indicated that none of the 
product terms were significant, all bs < .50; all ps > .05. Therefore, none of the significant 
mediational relations reported previously differed as a function of question order.  
 
Contrast A  
(Reasoned 
condition= 0) 
Drinking 
Behavioral 
Willingness 
Drinking 
Outcome 
Expectancies 
b = 4.37* b = .07*** 
b = .85* (.69† ) 
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Figure 3 
Mediation of effect of Contrast B on Behavioral Willingness to Drink Alcohol by Alcohol 
Outcome Expectancies 
 
Note. Model includes Time 1 drinking behavioral willingness, rationality and experientiality 
as covariates. 
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
 
Figure 4 
Illustration of Moderated Mediation Effects 
 
 
 
Contrast A 
 
Contrast B 
Behavioral 
Willingness 
Motivation 
/Outcome 
Expectancies Order Order 
a b 
c, c′ 
Contrast B  
(Experiential 
condition= 0) 
Drinking 
Behavioral 
Willingness 
Drinking 
Outcome 
Expectancies 
b = - 5.94** 
b = .07*** 
b = .11 (.39) 
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CHAPTER 10: STUDY 2 DISCUSSION 
The primary goals of Study 2 were to replicate the findings of Study 1, and if 
replicated, examine how those effects were mediated by motives and outcome 
expectancies. These goals were addressed by conducting an experiment in which 
participants were randomly assigned to receive one of three different processing 
instructions and to receive one of two questionnaire orders. Overall the hypotheses 
regarding route of processing were supported and the hypotheses regarding mediation of 
those effects was partially supported. Below, those findings are detailed, and elaborated 
upon. 
Efficacy of processing manipulation. Because Study 2 was only the second known 
study to manipulate route of processing, it was again necessary to validate that the 
manipulation was in fact affecting route of processing. Significant main effects of 
processing manipulation condition were expected on participants’ self-reported rationality 
when controlling for trait measures of rationality and experientiality. Specifically, it is was 
hypothesized that participants in the reasoned condition would report significantly greater 
rationality than participants in the control condition, who were similarly expected to report 
significantly greater rationality than participants in the experiential condition. Results 
revealed that the hypothesized main effect did emerge, and consistent with hypotheses, all 
three conditions were significantly different from one another in the hypothesized 
directions. Therefore, examination of participants’ self-reported rationality during the 
experimental session suggests that the processing manipulation effectively shifted 
participants’ perceived reliance on reasoned or experiential processing.  
It was also hypothesized that the processing condition manipulation would influence 
participants’ decision response times. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the reasoned 
condition participants would answer the questionnaire items slower than both the 
experiential and control condition participants. Similarly, the experiential condition was 
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expected to respond significantly faster than the other two processing condition. As 
hypothesized, processing condition influenced response times for all measures. Follow-up 
analyses revealed a consistent pattern of group differences for the behavioral willingness 
and behavioral intentions items. When participants reported behavioral willingness to have 
casual sex and to drink alcohol, the reasoned condition participants responded 
significantly slower than both the control and experiential condition participants, and those 
differences corresponded to medium to large effect sizes, Cohen’s ds > .50. The control 
and experiential conditions, however, did not significantly differ and reflected small effect 
sizes (Cohen’s ds < .20). In general, it appears that there was a medium to large effect of 
the processing manipulation on increasing the amount of time participants in the reasoned 
condition spent thinking about the behavioral willingness items, relative to the control and 
experiential groups. Not consistent with hypotheses, was the finding that the experiential 
and control conditions did not significantly differ. This finding suggests that the processing 
manipulation may have more effectively induced reasoned processing than experiential 
processing. 
Examination of the response times for behavioral intentions to have casual sex and 
drink alcohol, revealed that participants in the reasoned condition responded significantly 
slower than participants in the experiential condition, but not significantly slower than 
participants in the control conditions (although that contrast was marginally significant at p 
< .10). In addition, these differences represented small effect sizes Cohen’s ds < .40. 
Similarly to the behavioral willingness response times, the control and experiential 
conditions did not significantly differ from one another. These findings suggest that the 
processing manipulation may have more effectively influenced response times for 
participants in the reasoned condition than for participants in the other processing 
condition. In sum, the processing manipulation had the hypothesized main effects on the 
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self-reported rationality and on response times, although there is some evidence that the 
manipulation was more effective for the reasoned condition than the experiential condition.  
Effect of processing condition on behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions.  It 
was hypothesized that the processing manipulation would significantly affect behavioral 
willingness to engage in casual sex and drink alcohol. A main effect of processing 
manipulation on behavioral intentions was not expected. Consistent with hypotheses, 
there was a significant main effect of processing condition on behavioral willingness to 
engage in health risk behaviors. A consistent pattern emerged from the follow-up analyses 
conducted to further examine this main effect, such that participants in the reasoned 
conditions reported significantly lower behavioral willingness than participants in the 
control conditions, which corresponded to a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = .48). The 
experiential condition, however, did not significantly differ from either the reasoned or 
control conditions, and those non-significant differences corresponded to small effect sizes 
(Cohen’s ds < .30). Also consistent with hypotheses was the null effect of processing 
manipulation on behavioral intentions to engage in health risk behaviors. Overall these 
findings are consistent with the hypothesized main effects of the processing manipulation 
on behavioral willingness and the null effects for behavioral intentions. These findings 
have several implications which are discussed below. 
First, these results suggest that one’s route of processing can be influenced by 
external factors. This is important because previous research studies have used within-
subjects designs that simply ask participants, for example what “a rational person” would 
do, or what “most people” would do (e.g., Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). The 
underlying assumption with this protocol is that it is not possible to push people into one 
route of processing versus another. The results of this study suggest that individuals’ use 
of reasoned and experiential processing is malleable. It was originally hypothesized that 
the main effect of processing manipulation would be qualified by significant differences 
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between all three experimental conditions. Although the self-reported rationality 
significantly differed for all three groups, the response time differences were only 
significant between the reasoned and control groups. Similarly, the differences in 
behavioral willingness were only significant between the reasoned and control groups. 
Therefore, it appears that the processing manipulation more successfully shifted route of 
processing for participants in the reasoned condition than for participants in the 
experiential condition. 
Second, these results offer further support for the assumption that less risky 
decisions are the result of more reasoned processing. This contention has long been 
presented in the literature (Reyna & Farley, 2006), but not empirically tested until now. 
Empirical support for this claim is important because one could reasonably argue that risky 
decisions could sometimes be the result of reasoned processing. For example, it is 
feasible that adolescents might weigh the costs and benefits of a given risk behavior, such 
as binge drinking, and in a reasoned fashion arrive at the decision to engage in the risky 
behavior because the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs. Although this is 
still a possibility, evidence from the current study suggests that participants who were 
utilizing a reasoned route of processing did make significantly less risky decisions than 
participants in the control condition. Overall, the hypothesized effects of processing route 
on behavioral willingness and not on behavioral intentions were supported, although 
further research is needed to more effectively and reliably induce experiential processing.  
Effect of processing condition by question order interaction. Because order of 
questionnaire items was counterbalanced in the Study 2, a series of analyses were 
conducted to examine the affects of question order on behavioral willingness and 
behavioral intentions. Although the effects of question order were somewhat exploratory, it 
was not expected that a main effect of question order would emerge. As expected, there 
were no significant main effects of questionnaire order on behavioral willingness or 
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behavioral intentions for casual sex or drinking alcohol. Although there were no main 
effects of questionnaire order on behavioral willingness or behavioral intentions, it was still 
possible that the main effects of processing route on behavioral willingness could be 
moderated by questionnaire order. Therefore, interactions between processing route and 
question order on behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions were examined. As 
expected, there were no significant interaction effects. Therefore, the effects of the 
processing manipulation on behavioral willingness were not moderated by questionnaire 
order. This finding suggests that responding to the expectancy items does not influence 
participants’ responses to subsequent health risk questions. 
Effect of processing condition: Mediation analyses. It was hypothesized that the 
significant main effects of processing route on behavioral willingness would be mediated 
by alcohol outcome expectancies or sex motives (alcohol and sex respectively). 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that the reasoned condition participants would report less 
behavioral willingness than the other two conditions, and the effect would be mediated by 
significantly lower sex motives or more negative alcohol outcome expectancies. In 
addition, it was predicted that the experiential condition participants would report 
significantly higher behavioral willingness than participants in the other two conditions, and 
the effect would be mediated by an increase in sex motives or greater alcohol outcome 
expectancies. Overall, the findings were mixed, and this hypothesis received only partial 
support. Consistent with predictions, participants in the reasoned condition reported 
significantly lower behavioral willingness to have casual sex than the other two conditions, 
and the indirect effect through reduced sex motives was statistically significant. The effects 
of the experiential processing condition, relative to the other two conditions, on behavioral 
willingness and on alcohol outcome expectancies were not significant. In addition, there 
were no significant indirect effects of the experiential condition on behavioral willingness to 
have casual sex through outcome expectancies for sex. This pattern of results is not 
  
 
71
consistent with hypotheses, but is consistent with the pattern of results observed in Study 
2. These results suggest that the reasoned processing manipulation may have been more 
effective than the experiential processing condition, and that shifting participants to a more 
reasoned route of processing led to significantly lower outcome expectancies for sex. 
Unexpectedly, the pattern of results with respect to behavioral willingness to drink 
alcohol was the opposite of that observed for behavioral willingness to have casual sex. 
Specifically, the effects of the reasoned condition, relative to the other two conditions, on 
behavioral willingness to drink alcohol and on alcohol outcome expectancies were in the 
predicted directions (although the latter path was non-significant). The indirect effects 
through outcome expectancies, however, were non-significant. Therefore the pattern of 
indirect effects of the reasoned processing manipulation on behavioral willingness through 
outcome expectancies was different for casual sex and drinking behavioral willingness. 
When examining the effects of the experiential condition relative to the other two 
conditions, there was not a significant main effect of the experiential processing 
manipulation on behavioral willingness to drink alcohol, but there was a significant main 
effect on alcohol outcome expectancies. Interestingly, the indirect effect of the experiential 
processing condition on behavioral willingness to drink alcohol was statistically significant. 
These mixed findings are somewhat puzzling, and further explanation is provided below. 
It is possible that it is easier to promote reasoned processing in the laboratory and 
subsequently reduce the motives to engage in sexual activity. One could argue that the 
potential negative consequences associated with sexual behavior are more negative than 
the potential negative consequences associated with drinking alcohol (e.g., getting a 
sexually transmitted disease vs. becoming intoxicated). Therefore, it may be easier to 
induce reasoned processing and significantly reduce behavioral willingness to engage in 
casual sex, and reveal a significant indirect effect through reduced motives for the 
reasoned processing participants. This process may be more difficult for the experiential 
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processing participants because it may be more difficult to first, induce experiential 
processing, and second, significantly increase outcome expectancies for sexual behavior. 
This assertion is supported by the non-significant path from the experiential condition to 
outcome expectancies for sex, and the significant main effect of the reasoned processing 
manipulation on reduced outcome expectancies for sex. Overall, mean motives for 
engaging in sexual behavior were positive, and they may be more difficult to increase than 
outcome expectancies for drinking alcohol. Conversely, the effects of the processing 
manipulation on behavioral willingness to drink alcohol showed the opposite pattern. It 
appears that the reasoned processing manipulation did not significantly reduce outcome 
expectancies for drinking alcohol, but the experiential processing manipulation did 
significantly increase outcome expectancies. These findings suggest that it is easier to 
reduce outcome expectancies for sexual behavior than drinking behavior, and it is easier 
to increase outcome expectancies for drinking than motives for sexual behavior. What is 
noteworthy, however, is that this is the first study (that I am aware of) that documents that 
route of information processing can influence individuals’ outcome expectancies, although 
further research is needed to explore how this finding may be moderated by the behavior 
and participants’ experience with that behavior. 
Effect of processing condition: Moderated mediation analyses. Because no previous 
research studies have examined behavioral willingness and outcome expectancies and 
motives in the laboratory setting, the potential effects of answering outcome expectancies 
on behavioral willingness was unknown. Previous research has documented, however, 
that participants’ behavioral willingness can be influenced by other questions that precede 
the behavioral willingness measure. Therefore, question order was manipulated in Study 
2. Two possible patterns of mediation were tested and the results were consistent; the 
effects of processing condition on behavioral willingness were not moderated by 
questionnaire order. Thus, responses to behavioral willingness measures do not differ as a 
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result of the order in outcome expectancies are measured relative to behavioral 
willingness. 
  
  
 
74
CHAPTER 11: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The primary scientific objectives of this dissertation were to first to demonstrate that 
route of processing can be affected by external factors in the environment, and second to 
examine the effects of one’s route of processing on health risk cognitions, and finally 
examine how those effects were mediated by outcome expectancies for alcohol and motives 
for sex. No other studies have used a between-subjects manipulation to induce reasoned 
and experiential processing to examined how one’s route of processing influences health 
risk cognitions. Additionally, no other studies have specifically examined how route of 
information processing influences one’s outcome expectancies and motives  for health risk 
behaviors.  
Overview of Results 
 Efficacy of processing manipulation. Overall, the results of these studies were 
consistent with one another. Two studies were conducted to test whether route of 
information processing could be experimentally induced. Participants in these studies 
received explicit verbal and written instructions that were aimed at influencing route of 
processing. A series of measures commonly used in other studies to infer route of 
processing were included in these studies to validate that participants’ route of processing 
had been altered. Results from both studies suggest that participants’ route of processing 
was successfully shifted. Although results demonstrated significant main effects of the 
processing manipulation on these measures, pairwise condition comparisons suggest that 
the processing manipulation may have more successfully induced reasoned processing than 
experiential processing.  
 Effect of processing condition and question order on health risk cognitions. It was 
hypothesized that route of processing would influences people’s health risk decisions. The 
results from both studies suggest that route of processing does in fact influence participants’ 
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behavioral willingness to engage health risk behaviors.  It was hypothesized that the order in 
which people respond to the questionnaire items would also influence their responses to 
those items. Because previous research has demonstrated that responses to behavioral 
willingness can be influenced by other questions during measurement, the order of 
behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions was counterbalanced in Study 1. Overall, 
there were not consistent main effects of questionnaire order, and there was not consistent 
evidence that questionnaire order moderated the effects of the processing manipulation 
when answering the behavioral willingness items. Questionnaire order was also manipulated 
in Study 2, where the order of behavioral willingness and outcome expectancies was 
counterbalanced. The results from Study 2 clearly demonstrated that participants’ behavioral 
willingness was not affected by question order. Therefore, responding to outcome 
expectancies prior to responding to behavioral willingness did not influence behavioral 
willingness. Moreover, questionnaire order did not moderate the effects of the processing 
manipulation in Study 2. Thus, it appears that questionnaire order may have an influence on 
health risk cognitions, but perhaps these effects are diminished in the presence of other 
environmental factors, such as the processing instructions used in the current research. 
 Effect of processing condition: Mediated effects.  An additional goal of this 
dissertation was to examine the effects of individuals’ route of processing on behavioral 
willingness to engage in health risk behaviors was mediated by alcohol outcome 
expectancies and sex motives, respectively. Overall, the findings testing these hypothesized 
effects were mixed, but it appears that the effects of route of processing on behavioral 
willingness via outcome expectancies and motives may be moderated by the specific health 
risk behavior. The results of the current investigation suggest that it may easier to reduce 
motives for sexual behavior than reduce the positivity of alcohol outcome expectancies for 
drinking behavior when participants are utilizing a reasoned route of processing. In addition 
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it may be easier to increase participants’ outcome expectancies for alcohol than increase 
sex motives when utilizing an experiential route of processing.  
Future Directions  
 While this dissertation contributes to the understanding of how peoples’ route of 
processing can be influenced by external factors in the environment, and how that route of 
processing can influence health risk cognitions, several questions remain. First, this 
research examined only two specific health risk behaviors. Future studies could examine the 
effects of route of processing on behavioral intentions and behavioral willingness to engage 
in a variety of other drinking and sex related behaviors (e.g., intentions to have 
monogamous sex, intentions to use a condom in the future, and willingness to do so). This 
would allow for a greater understanding of what dimensions of drinking and sexual risk 
behaviors are more dependent upon reasoned and experiential routes of processing.  
In addition, the manipulation used in this study to affect route of processing was 
admittedly a “heavy handed” manipulation. Future studies could begin to examine how route 
of processing may be influenced by external factors that are more subtle. Response time 
has been proposed to be a major determinant of experiential processing; therefore it is 
possible to examine behavioral willingness and behavioral intentions to engage in risk 
behaviors under time constraints. It may be possible in future studies to induce a more 
reasoned route of processing with instructions sets that may have fewer demand 
characteristics associated with them. Finally, the indirect effects of route of processing on 
behavioral willingness in the current study were not consistent. Future research studies 
should explore the relations between people’s route of processing and their outcome 
expectancies for a variety of health risk behaviors.   
Limitations 
Conclusions from this research should be considered in the context of its limitations. 
Among the most significant of these are issues with sample sizes and data collection 
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procedures. In Study 1, firm conclusions, especially as they relate to differences in findings 
between sex and alcohol behavioral willingness, are limited because of the lower sample 
size for the alcohol items. The lower sample size for the alcohol items is due to the fact that 
mass testing occurred at two different time points throughout the academic semester, and 
there was a slight difference in the items that were included in those sessions. Specifically, 
the alcohol items were not included in the second mass testing session, which resulted in a 
lower number of respondents for the alcohol items. It may be the case that a different 
pattern of findings emerged for sex and alcohol behavioral willingness because the sample 
size for the alcohol items was too low. Additionally, a limitation with the data collection 
procedures in Study 2 was that most participants (80%) participated in mass testing, “Time 
1”, after they had participated in the experimental session. This was due to the timing of the 
department of psychology’s mass testing session relative to the initiation of data collection in 
the experiment. Although this may have influenced the results of Study 2 to some degree, 
analyses examining the two groups of participants separately did not suggest this was the 
case.  
Conclusions 
This dissertation contributes important empirical evidence regarding dual-process 
theories of reasoning and health risk. First, this research demonstrates that route of 
processing can be influenced by external factors in the environment. This research 
documents that route of processing is in fact malleable, and the consequences of that shift 
in processing has implications for individuals’ health risk cognitions. Specifically, this 
research documents that consistent with the tenets of the prototype willingness model, 
behavioral willingness to engage in health risk behavior is more malleable than behavioral 
intentions, and reasoned information processing reduces individuals’ behavioral willingness 
to engage in casual sex and drink alcohol. The studies included in this dissertation are only 
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the beginning of a long line of exciting research examining the degree to which individual’s 
route of information processing can be manipulated, and the implications that will have on 
both laboratory based, and real world health risk behaviors.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Researchers have debated what rationality in decision making really means. The 
correspondence view of rationality requires that the end-result of the behavior be a positive 
outcome (Reyna & Farley, 2006). In contrast, the coherence view requires only that the 
decision making process be consistent with the actor’s desired outcomes. For example, 
some teens admit that they want to drink alcohol in excess in order to have a good time. 
Most people, and those that prescribe to the correspondence view, would argue that this is 
in fact an illogical choice. Those that prescribe to the coherence view, however, would argue 
that while it is certainly not a “good choice” it is not illogical, and in fact can be a very well 
“reasoned” decision. Dual-process theories in general, do not suggest that there is a 
necessary relation between “computational complexity” and outcomes (Klaczynski, 2001).  
2. Although there is much similarity between how dual-process models conceptualize 
experiential processing, there are key differences. For example, some models propose that 
the experiential system operates primarily on pre-existing heuristics stored in memory (e.g., 
Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Other models, however, propose that it is the rapid and pre-
conscious nature of the information processing that characterizes experiential processing 
(which can include heuristics), rather than sole reliance upon pre-existing knowledge 
structures (e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 1999). For the purposes of these studies, the latter 
conceptualization will be used. 
3. One theoretical question that remains unanswered in the dual-processing literature 
concerns the relative influence of both the experiential and the reasoned processing 
systems on overt behavior. Many dual-process researchers hypothesize that overt behavior 
represents a compromise between the influences of both the reasoned and the experiential 
systems (e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 1999, Evans, 1996, 1998). Other researchers, however, 
posit that overt behavior is almost always the result of the experiential system alone 
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(Klaczynski, 2004; Wadda & Nittono, 2004). Theoretically, any differences, or lack of, 
between participants not given instructions on how to process information, and those that 
are induced into processing primarily in a reasoned or experiential fashion, will reveal the 
degree to which decisions reflect the relative influence from each processing system. 
4. Reliabilities for the Rationality subscale (α= .91) and the experientiality (α= .81) subscales 
from the full Rationality Experientiality Inventory were slightly higher than the internal 
reliabilities achieved with the shortened version used in this study. 
5. A series of repeated measures ANCOVAS were also conducted to examine within-
subjects differences in participants’ self-reported confidence. Rationality and experientiality 
scores were included as covariates while processing manipulation condition served as the 
between-subjects independent variable. The purpose of this analyses was to determine if 
participants reported significantly different confidence levels in 1/10 than 10/100 odds or 
from 1/10 than 9/100 odds. These analyses revealed no significant within-subject effects, Fs 
< .01, ps > .94.  
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APPENDIX A: PROCESSING MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Control / No manipulation instructions 
We have a set of hypothetical scenarios that we would like you to read through. After 
reading each scenario, you will be asked to make some judgments and decisions about that 
scenario.  We know that people do not always make decisions in the same way. Sometimes 
people make decisions based on logic, and other times people make decisions based on 
intuition. For this study we would like you to simply answer all questionnaire items as you, 
yourself, would normally do. 
 
Reasoned Processing Instructions 
We have a set of hypothetical scenarios that we would like you to read through. After 
reading each scenario, you will be asked to make some judgments and decisions about 
each scenario. We know that people do not always make decisions in the same way. 
Sometimes people make decisions based on logic, and other times people make decisions 
based on intuition. For this study we would like you to think carefully, using logic to come to 
your answers. We want you to be sure of your answer because at the end of the session, 
we will randomly pick some of the questions you answered, and you will be asked to explain 
how you arrived at your decision for that question. Please keep these instructions in mind 
while answering all questionnaire items. 
 
Experiential Processing Instructions 
We have a set of hypothetical scenarios that we would like you to read through. After 
reading each scenario, you will be asked to make some judgments and decisions about 
each scenario. We know that people do not always make decisions in the same way. 
Sometimes people make decisions based on logic, and other times people make decisions 
based on intuition. For this study we would like you to go with what feels right, using your 
gut reaction to come to your answers. We want you to arrive at your decisions as efficiently 
as possible, selecting your choice as soon as you think you have the decided. Please keep 
these instructions in mind while answering all questionnaire items. 
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APPENDIX B: RATIONAL EXPERIENTIAL INVENTORY 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Definitely 
not true 
of myself 
   Definitely 
true of 
myself 
 
Rationality sub-scale 
1. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. (re-) 
2. I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems. (ra-) 
3. I enjoy intellectual challenges. (re) 
4. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. (ra-) 
5. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. (re-) 
6. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. (re) 
7. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. (re-) 
8. I am not a very analytical thinker. (ra-) 
9. Reasoning things our carefully is not one of my strong points. (ra-) 
10. I don’t reason well under pressure (ra-) 
 
Experientiality sub-scale 
1. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. (ee) 
2. I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. (ea-) 
3. Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. (ea) 
4. I believe in trusting my hunches. (ea) 
5. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. (ee) 
6. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. (ee) 
7. I trust my initial feelings about people. (ea) 
8. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. (ea-) 
9. I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. (ee-) 
10. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. (ee-) 
 
ee=experiential engagement; ea=experiential ability; re=rational engagement; rational 
ability. A minus sign (-) with a scale item denotes reverse coding of that item. 
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APPENDIX C: FULL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Behavioral Willingness  
Suppose you were at a party and met a man/woman for the first time.  You think that he/she 
is very attractive, and the two of you get along very well.  At the end of the evening, you go 
to his/her apartment with him/her.  You’re feeling as if you might like to have sex with 
him/her, and he/she obviously feels the same way.  How willing would you be to do each of 
the following? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at 
all 
willing 
  Maybe   Very 
willing 
 
1.  Stay at his/her apartment and have oral sex. 
2.  Stay at his/her apartment and have sex. 
3.  Stay at his/her apartment, but don’t have sex. 
Suppose that you are at a party with friends on a Saturday night.  After a few drinks you are 
beginning to feel that you may have had enough, and you are getting ready to leave.  Then 
a friend you haven't seen for a while starts talking to you and offers to get you another drink.  
How willing would you be to do each of the following? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at 
all 
willing 
  Maybe   Very 
willing 
 
4.  Stay and have one more drink. 
5.  Stay and continue to drink (more than one drink). 
6.  Stay, but not drink any more. 
7.  In this situation, how many drinks do you think you would be willing to have? (use the 
scale below) 
 
A B C D E F G H I J 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Intentions 
8.  In the next 6 months, do you intend to have casual sex? (for all questions, casual sex is 
defined as sex with someone you don’t know very well) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Definitely 
not 
  Maybe   Definitely 
 
9.  In the next 6 months, how likely is it that you will have casual sex?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at 
all likely 
  Maybe   Very likely 
 
10.  In the next month, do you intend to have 5 or more drinks in a single drinking episode? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Definitely   Maybe   Definitely  
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Not 
 
11.  In the next month, how likely is it that you will have 5 or more drinks in a single drinking 
episode? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at 
all likely 
  Maybe   Very likely 
 
Previous Behavior 
12.  How many people have you had sexual intercourse with in your lifetime?   
A B C D E F G H I J 
None 1 2 3 4 5 6-7 8-9 10-11 12 or 
more 
 
13.  How many times have you had casual sex in your lifetime?   
A B C D E F G H I J 
None 1 or 2 3 to 6 7 to 9 10 to 
12 
13 to 
15 
16 to 
19 
20 to 
22 
23 to 
25 
More 
than 
25 
 
14.  Please indicate how many times you have had a whole drink of alcohol (for example, a 
bottle of beer or a whole mixed drink) during the last month: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Never Once Twice 3-5 6-8 9-11 12 or 
more 
15.  Please indicate how many times you have had 5 or more drinks in a single drinking 
episode during the last 3 months: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Never Once Twice 3-5 6-8 9-11 12 or 
more 
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Outcome Expectancies  
 
Before deciding to engage in sexual activity or drink alcohol, people may consider many 
reasons they may or may not want to engage that behavior. The following are commonly 
cited reasons why one may or may not engage in sexual activity or drink alcohol. For each 
of the following items please indicate...  
 
(1) Would this go through your mind (i.e. would you consider this) 
1 2 3 4 5 
No, Definitely 
would Not 
No, Would not Maybe Yes, it Would Yes, It 
Definitely would 
 
and (2) how important would this be to you when making your decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
unimportant 
Neither 
important, 
or 
unimportant 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
 
When making your response – please consider why you would or would engage in these 
behaviors. 
 
Motivations for engaging in sexual activity 
1. I would have sex because I was attracted to the other person 
2. I would have sex because I want the experience physical pleasure 
3. I would have sex because the opportunity presented itself 
4. I would have sex because I want to show ay affection to the person 
5. I would have sex because it would make me feel desired 
6. I would have sex because I felt sexually aroused and wanted the release 
7. I would have sex because it is fun 
8. I would have sex because I was in love 
9. I would have sex because I would be in the heat of the moment 
10. I would have sex because I would feel better about myself afterwards 
11. I would have sex because I wanted to please my partner 
12. I would have sex because I desire emotional closeness (i.e., intimacy) 
Motivations for not engaging in Sexual Activity 
1. I would not have sex because of a personal commitment to delaying sexual activity 
(until older, until marriage, etc.) 
2. I would not have sex because my family wants me to delay sexual activity 
3. I would not have sex until I felt a deeper level of trust with the other person 
4. I would not have sex because of the risk of getting (a girl) pregnant 
5. I would not have sex because of the risk of passing/receiving a sexually transmitted 
infection (e.g., Herpes, HIV) 
6. I would not have sex because doing so could interfere with my future goals  
7. I would not have sex because I would feel badly afterwards (guilty, dirty, etc.) 
8. I would not have sex because of my religious beliefs 
9. I would not have sex because it could hurt my relationship with the other person. 
10. I would not have sex because it could affect my reputation 
Motivation for consuming Alcohol 
1. I would drink Alcohol because I would have a good time 
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2. I would drink alcohol because it would be easier for me to socialize 
3. I would drink alcohol because I would feel part of a group 
4. I would drink alcohol because I would be able to take my mind of problems 
5. I would drink alcohol because I enjoy the buzz 
6. I would drink because I am more accepted socially when I drink 
7. I would drink alcohol because I am less shy 
8. I would drink alcohol because I am more relaxed when I drink 
9. I would drink alcohol because I am more energetic when I drink 
10. I would drink alcohol because I am more outgoing 
11. I would drink alcohol because I feel relaxed 
12. I would drink alcohol because I am less sexually inhibited 
Motivations for not consuming alcohol. 
1. I would not drink alcohol because I would do things I wouldn’t’ do otherwise 
2. I would not drink because I am less alert 
3. I would not drink because I would feel sick 
4. I would not drink because I would behave badly 
5. I would not drink because I take more risks 
6. I would not drink because I get sleepy or tired 
7. I would not drink because I feel sad or depressed 
8. I would not drink because I lose my self-control 
9. I would not drink because I become clumsy or uncoordinated 
10. I would not drink because I would feel ashamed of myself 
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APPENDIX D: STUDY 1 CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY 
CONDITION 
 
Table D1 
Study 1 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Reasoned Condition only 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Rational 1 
34 
.09 
33 
-.13 
87 
-.08 
34 
-.02 
25 
-.07 
34 
-.41* 
26 
.04 
34 
-.16 
25 
-.06 
34 
2. Experiential 1 
35 
.09 
33 
.19 
35 
-.08 
25 
-.01 
35 
-.18 
27 
.24 
35 
.01 
26 
.24 
35 
3. Casual sex BW (Time 1) 1 
33 
.85*** 
33 
.35† 
25 
.42* 
33 
.65*** 
27 
.52** 
33 
.48* 
26 
.34* 
33 
4. Casual sex BW (Time 2)  1 
56 
.35† 
25 
.25** 
56 
.51** 
27 
.74*** 
56 
.41* 
26 
.34** 
56 
5. Drinking BW (Time 1)   1 
25 
.75*** 
25 
.54** 
25 
.58** 
25 
.76*** 
24 
.69*** 
25 
6. Drinking BW (Time 2)    1 
56 
.59** 
27 
.31* 
56 
.62*** 
26 
.56*** 
56 
7. Casual sex BI (Time 1)     1 
27 
.63*** 
27 
.61*** 
26 
.37† 
27 
8. Casual sex BI (Time 2)      1 
56 
.52** 
26 
.42*** 
56 
9. Drinking BI (Time 1)       1 
26 
.80*** 
26 
10. Drinking BI (Time 2)        1 
56 
Mean 
(SD) 
33.8 
(7.36) 
32.2 
(7.72) 
6.73 
(4.79) 
6.34 
(3.85) 
7.96 
(3.90) 
8.88 
(3.46) 
4.78 
(3.69) 
4.48 
(3.73) 
15.73 
(10.07) 
17.69 
(9.92) 
Note. Sample sizes are reported on diagonal. Rational refers to the rationality score from the Rational 
Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from Rational Experiential 
Inventory. BW refers to behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions.  
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table D2 
Study 1 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Experiential Condition only 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Rational 1 
27 
-.06 
26 
-.06 
27 
-.13 
27 
-.06 
24 
-.24 
27 
-.15 
24 
-.24 
27 
-.03 
24 
-.22 
27 
2. 
Experiential 
 1 
26 
.19 
26 
.22 
26 
-.22 
24 
-.09 
26 
.01 
24 
.02 
26 
-.12 
24 
-.16 
26 
3. Casual sex BW (Time 1) 1 
27 
.88*** 
27 
.39† 
24 
.32† 
27 
.78*** 
24 
.67*** 
27 
.51** 
24 
.51** 
27 
4. Casual sex BW (Time 2) 1 
41 
.36† 
24 
.44** 
41 
.80*** 
24 
.71*** 
41 
.55** 
24 
.49*** 
41 
5. Drinking BW (Time 1)   1 
24 
.68*** 
24 
.33 
24 
.17 
24 
.78*** 
24 
.78*** 
24 
6. Drinking BW (Time 2)    1 
41 
.41* 
24 
36* 
41 
..67** 
24 
.71*** 
41 
7. Casual sex BI (Time 1)     1 
24 
.90*** 
24 
.58** 
24 
.60** 
24 
8. Casual sex BI (Time 2)      1 
41 
.48* 
24 
.47** 
41 
9. Drinking BI (Time 1)       1 
24 
.93*** 
24 
10. Drinking BI (Time 2)        1 
41 
Mean 
SD 
35.56 
5.44 
35.19 
3.84 
4.85 
3.44 
6.83 
3.90 
6.63 
3.76 
9.05 
3.16 
3.75 
2.63 
5.24 
3.74 
13.42 
10.41 
17.87 
9.49 
Note. Sample sizes are reported on diagonal. Rational refers to the rationality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from Rational 
Experiential Inventory. BW refers to behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions.  
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table D3 
Study 1 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics Control Condition only 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Rational 1 
31 
.04 
31 
.02 
28 
-.13 
31 
-.01 
22 
-.06 
31 
-.05 
22 
.05 
31 
-.21 
22 
-.11 
31 
2. Experiential 1 
31 
-.13 
28 
-.12 
31 
-.13 
22 
-.07 
31 
-.32 
22 
-.51** 
31 
-.03 
22 
-.04 
31 
3. Casual sex BW (Time 1) 1 
28 
.67*** 
28 
-.04 
22 
.38* 
28 
.79*** 
22 
.47** 
28 
.15 
22 
.49** 
28 
4. Casual sex BW (Time 2)  1 
42 
.08 
22 
.40** 
42 
.39† 
22 
.45** 
42 
.35 
22 
.64*** 
42 
5. Drinking BW (Time 1)   1 
22 
.70*** 
22 
-.15 
22 
-.04 
22 
.68** 
22 
.49* 
22 
6. Drinking BW (Time 2)    1 
42 
.14 
22 
.20 
42 
.59** 
22 
.55** 
42 
7. Casual sex BI (Time 1)     1 
22 
.52** 
22 
.09 
22 
.08 
22 
8. Casual sex BI (Time 2)      1 
42 
.09 
22 
.34* 
42 
9. Drinking BI (Time 1)       1 
22 
.85*** 
22 
10. Drinking BI (Time 2)        1 
42 
Mean 
(SD) 
32.00 
(5.98) 
34.77 
(4.54) 
4.75 
(3.77) 
5.93 
(3.56) 
5.18 
(2.54) 
8.33 
(3.40) 
3.41 
(3.00) 
3.52 
(2.66) 
12.31 
(8.55) 
16.98 
(9.70) 
Note. Sample sizes are reported on diagonal. Rational refers to the rationality score from the 
Rational Experiential Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from Rational 
Experiential Inventory. BW refers to behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions.   
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Appendix E: Study 2 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics by Condition 
Table E1 
Study 2 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Time 1 and Time 2 variables for Reasoned Condition only 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Rational 1 
66 
.11 
62 
-.10 
66 
.05 
66 
-.08 
66 
-.05 
66 
-.08 
65 
-.07 
66 
-.09 
66 
-.06 
66 
-.02 
66 
-.10 
66 
2. Experiential  1 
63 
-.19 
63 
-.22† 
63 
.21† 
63 
.20 
63 
-.19 
62 
-.24† 
63 
.19 
63 
.07 
63 
.03 
63 
.21† 
63 
3. Casual sex BW (Time 1) 1 
67 
.82*** 
67 
.32** 
67 
.29* 
67 
.64*** 
66 
.60*** 
67 
.34** 
67 
.26* 
67 
.59*** 
67 
.32** 
67 
4. Casual sex BW (Time 2)  1 
67 
.21† 
67 
.31** 
67 
.56*** 
66 
.53*** 
67 
.25* 
67 
.24* 
67 
.21† 
67 
.43*** 
67 
5. Drinking BW (Time 1)   1 
67 
.64*** 
67 
.47*** 
66 
.45*** 
67 
.72*** 
67 
.57*** 
67 
.20† 
67 
.43*** 
67 
6. Drinking BW (Time 2)    1 
67 
.43*** 
66 
.30* 
67 
.50*** 
67 
.56*** 
67 
.20† 
67 
.53*** 
67 
7. Casual sex BI (Time 1)     1 
66 
.85*** 
66 
.43*** 
66 
.31** 
66 
.32** 
66 
.27* 
66 
8. Casual sex BI (Time 2)      1 
67 
.36** 
67 
.27* 
67 
.33** 
67 
.22† 
67 
9. Drinking BI (Time 1)       1 
67 
.73*** 
67 
.25* 
67 
.59*** 
67 
10. Drinking BI (Time 2)        1 
67 
.79 
67 
.73*** 
67 
11. Sex expectancies         1 
67 
.32** 
67 
12. Alcohol expectancies          1 
67 
Mean 
(SD) 
34.76 
(7.15) 
34.13 
(5.92) 
5.39 
(3.92) 
5.49 
(3.58) 
6.84 
(3.26) 
6.91 
(3.45) 
3.55 
(3.03) 
3.61 
(2.72) 
6.9 
(4.69) 
14.46 
(8.89) 
3.36 
(10.42) 
1.20 
(11.64) 
Note. Sample sizes are reported on diagonal. Rational refers to the rationality score from the Rational Experiential 
Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from Rational Experiential Inventory. BW refers to 
behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions.  
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table E2 
Study 2 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Time 1 and Time 2 variables for Experiential Condition only 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Rational 1 
58 
.29* 
57 
.08 
58 
.12 
58 
-.04 
57 
-.27* 
58 
.00 
57 
-.06 
58 
.05 
57 
-.09 
58 
.09 
58 
-.20 
58 
2. Experiential  1 
60 
-.07 
60 
-.01 
60 
.20 
59 
.42 
60 
-.08 
59 
-.09 
60 
.26* 
59 
.30* 
60 
.11 
60 
.18 
60 
3. Casual sex BW (Time 1) 1 
61 
.76*** 
61 
.35** 
60 
.19 
61 
.78*** 
60 
.66*** 
61 
.34** 
60 
.12 
61 
.73*** 
61 
.21 
61 
4. Casual sex BW (Time 2)  1 
65 
.26* 
60 
.17 
65 
.63*** 
60 
.70*** 
65 
.24† 
60 
.13 
65 
.75*** 
65 
.15 
65 
5. Drinking BW (Time 1)   1 
60 
.75*** 
60 
.23† 
59 
.38** 
60 
.71*** 
59 
.65*** 
60 
.52*** 
60 
.60*** 
60 
6. Drinking BW (Time 2)    1 
65 
.11 
60 
.23† 
65 
.59*** 
60 
.60*** 
65 
.48*** 
65 
.65*** 
65 
7. Casual sex BI (Time 1)     1 
60 
.79*** 
60 
.37** 
59 
.15 
60 
.60*** 
60 
.26* 
60 
8. Casual sex BI (Time 2)      1 
65 
.30* 
60 
.31** 
65 
.64*** 
65 
.36** 
65 
9. Drinking BI (Time 1)       1 
60 
.77*** 
60 
.48*** 
60 
.70*** 
65 
10. Drinking BI (Time 2)        1 
65 
.39*** 
65 
.70*** 
65 
11. Sex expectancies         1 
65 
.49*** 
65 
12. Alcohol expectancies          1 
65 
Mean 
(SD) 
35.74 
(6.90) 
34.97 
(6.65) 
5.57 
(4.09) 
6.09 
(3.82) 
8.37 
(3.70) 
8.26 
(3.62) 
4.67 
(4.13) 
4.48 
(4.02) 
8.42 
(4.78) 
18.03 
(8.97) 
5.86 
(11.00) 
7.12 
(12.77) 
Note. Sample sizes are reported on diagonal. Rational refers to the rationality score from the Rational Experiential 
Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from Rational Experiential Inventory. BW refers to behavioral 
willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions.  
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table E3 
Study 2 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Time 1 and Time 2 variables for Control Condition only 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Rational 1 
69 
-.10 
67 
-.01 
68 
.11 
69 
-.30* 
68 
-.33** 
69 
-.12 
67 
-.08 
69 
-.19 
68 
-.29 
69 
-.13 
69 
-.32** 
69 
2. Experiential 
 1 
69 
.14 
68 
.02 
69 
.07 
68 
.08 
69 
-.01 
67 
.06 
69 
.07 
69 
.06 
69 
.15 
69 
-.06 
69 
3. Casual sex BW (Time 1) 1 
70 
.85*** 
70 
.44*** 
69 
.41*** 
70 
.64*** 
69 
.60*** 
70 
.41*** 
69 
.32** 
70 
.48*** 
70 
.29* 
70 
4. Casual sex BW (Time 2) 
 1 
72 
.25* 
70 
.23† 
72 
.50*** 
69 
.54*** 
72 
.28* 
70 
.19 
72 
.55*** 
72 
.23* 
72 
5. Drinking BW (Time 1) 
  1 
70 
.77*** 
70 
.51*** 
68 
.45*** 
70 
.74*** 
69 
.72*** 
70 
.29* 
70 
.49*** 
70 
6. Drinking BW (Time 2) 
   1 
72 
.54*** 
69 
.46*** 
72 
.78*** 
70 
.82*** 
72 
.22† 
72 
.55*** 
72 
7. Casual sex BI (Time 1) 
    1 
69 
.81*** 
69 
.53*** 
68 
.46*** 
69 
.30* 
69 
.35** 
69 
8. Casual sex BI (Time 2) 
     1 
72 
.43*** 
70 
.42*** 
72 
.33** 
72 
.37*** 
72 
9. Drinking BI (Time 1) 
      1 
70 
.90*** 
70 
.25* 
70 
.60*** 
70 
10. Drinking BI (Time 2) 
       1 
72 
.27* 
72 
.66*** 
72 
11. Sex expectancies 
        
1 
72 
.43*** 
72 
12. Alcohol expectancies 
         
1 
72 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
35.81 
(6.48) 
34.16 
(6.41) 
5.33 
(3.83) 
6.31 
(3.99) 
7.51 
(3.52) 
8.33 
(3.76) 
3.67 
(3.10) 
3.83 
(3.29) 
7.99 
(4.91) 
6.97 
(10.00) 
3.53 
(12.40) 
Note. Sample sizes are reported on diagonal. Rational refers to the rationality score from the Rational Experiential 
Inventory. Experiential refers to the experientiality score from Rational Experiential Inventory. BW refers to 
behavioral willingness. BI refers to behavioral intentions.  
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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APPENDIX F: STUDY 2 REGRESSION ANALYSES TESTING MEDIATION 
THROUGH SEX MOTIVES AND ALCOHOL OUTCOME EXPECTANCIES 
 
Table F1 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Condition Predicting Casual Sex 
Behavioral Willingness through Sex Motives 
 b SE b t  b SE b t 
Total Effect of IV on DV Total Effect of IV on DV 
Total effect of 
Condition A on 
BW 
.82 .34 2.35* 
Total effect of 
Condition B on  
BW 
-.14 .36 -.39 
Direct Effect of IV on DV Direct Effect of IV on DV 
Direct effect of 
Condition A on 
BW 
.57 .34 1.69† 
Direct effect of 
Condition B on  
BW 
-.10 .34 -.30 
Direct effect of IV on Mediator Direct effect of IV on Mediator 
Direct effect of 
Condition A on 
Expectancies 
2.97 1.32 2.25* 
Direct effect of 
Condition B on 
Expectancies 
-.42 1.37 -.31 
Direct Effect of Mediator on DV Direct Effect of Mediator on DV 
Direct effect of 
expectancies 
on BW 
.08 .02 4.51*** 
Direct effect of 
expectancies 
on BW 
.09 .02 4.81*** 
Note. Condition A (reasoned = 0, experiential and control = 1). 
Condition B (experiential = 0, reasoned and control = 1). 
Model includes Time 1 casual sex behavioral willingness, rationality and experientiality 
as covariates. 
 
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
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Table F2 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Condition Predicting Drinking 
Behavioral Willingness through Alcohol Outcome Expectancies 
 b SE b t  b SE b t 
Total Effect of IV on DV Total Effect of IV on DV 
Total effect of 
Condition A 
on BW 
.85 .39 2.17* 
Total effect of 
Condition B 
on  
BW 
.11 .41 .27 
Direct Effect of IV on DV Direct Effect of IV on DV 
Direct effect of 
Condition A 
on BW 
.69 .38 1.83† 
Direct effect 
of Condition B 
on  
BW 
.39 .39 .99 
Direct effect of IV on Mediator Direct effect of IV on Mediator 
Direct effect of 
Condition A 
on 
Expectancies 
2.31 1.68 1.38 
Direct effect 
of Condition B 
on 
Expectancies 
-3.68 1.71 -2.14* 
Direct Effect of Mediator on DV Direct Effect of Mediator on DV 
Direct effect of 
expectancies 
on BW 
.07 .02 4.21*** 
Direct effect 
of 
expectancies 
on BW 
.08 .02 4.49*** 
Note. Condition A (reasoned = 0, experiential and control = 1). 
Condition B (experiential = 0, reasoned and control = 1). 
Model includes Time 1 drinking behavioral willingness, rationality and experientiality as 
covariates. 
 
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
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Table F3 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Condition Predicting Casual Sex Behavioral 
Willingness through Sex Outcome Expectancies by importance 
 b SE b t  b SE b t 
Total Effect of IV on DV Total Effect of IV on DV 
Total effect of 
Condition A on 
BW 
.58 .33 1.73† 
Total effect of 
Condition B on  
BW 
-.11 .34 -.32 
Direct Effect of IV on DV Direct Effect of IV on DV 
Direct effect of 
Condition A on 
BW 
.58 .34 1.72† 
Direct effect of 
Condition B on  
BW 
-.11 .34 -.33 
Direct effect of IV on Mediator Direct effect of IV on Mediator 
Direct effect of 
Condition A on 
Expectancies by 
importance 
-14.62 28.27 -.52 
Direct effect of 
Condition B on 
Expectancies 
by importance 
-16.63 28.53 -.58 
Direct Effect of Mediator on DV Direct Effect of Mediator on DV 
Direct effect of 
expectancies by 
importance on 
BW 
-.00 .00 -.11 
Direct effect of 
expectancies 
by importance 
on BW 
-.00 .00 -.19 
Note. Condition A (reasoned = 0, experiential and control = 1). 
Condition B (experiential = 0, reasoned and control = 1). 
Model includes Time 1 casual sex behavioral willingness, rationality, experientiality, sex outcome 
expectancies, and importance of outcome expectancies as covariates. 
 
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
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Table F4 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Condition Predicting Drinking Behavioral 
Willingness through Alcohol Outcome Expectancies by importance 
 b SE b t  b SE b t 
Total Effect of IV on DV Total Effect of IV on DV 
Total effect of 
Condition A on 
BW 
.70 .38 1.86† 
Total effect of 
Condition B on  
BW 
.37 .39 .93 
Direct Effect of IV on DV Direct Effect of IV on DV 
Direct effect of 
Condition A on 
BW 
.71 .38 1.87† 
Direct effect of 
Condition B on  
BW 
.37 .39 .92 
Direct effect of IV on Mediator Direct effect of IV on Mediator 
Direct effect of 
Condition A on 
Expectancies by 
importance 
42.72 56.33 .76 
Direct effect of 
Condition B on 
Expectancies 
by importance 
-62.46 58.43 -1.07 
Direct Effect of Mediator on DV Direct Effect of Mediator on DV 
Direct effect of 
expectancies by 
importance on 
BW 
-.00 .00 -.25 
Direct effect of 
expectancies 
by importance 
on BW 
.00 .00 -.07 
Note. Condition A (reasoned = 0, experiential and control = 1). 
Condition B (experiential = 0, reasoned and control = 1). 
Model includes Time 1 drinking behavioral willingness, rationality, experientiality, alcohol outcome 
expectancies, and importance of outcome expectancies as covariates. 
 
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
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